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ABSTRACT 
Myanmar has gone through major changes since 2010, and this has led Western 
powers to lift most of the sanctions that they have imposed on the country since 1988. 
This thesis asks whether the sanctions were instrumental in generating the Myanmar 
government’s decision to reform. Studies on sanctions are generally pessimistic about 
the prospect of imposed sanctions being successful. Similarly, studies on the effect 
sanctions against Myanmar did not predict that sanctions would have an effect. 
Rational choice theory holds that sanctions will be effective if their cost outweigh the 
cost of compliance. If a target with complete information finds it rational to comply, it 
will do so when faced with the threat of sanctions, to avoid them being imposed. A 
target can comply after sanctions are imposed, if it initially miscalculated the 
likelihood of sanctions or the cost of sanctions, or if it believed that sanctions would 
be imposed regardless of whether it complied. This thesis seeks to identify whether 
the sanctions imposed on Myanmar had any effect by considering whether it made, 
and eventually corrected, any of these miscalculations. 
The thesis finds that sanctions came to play a role in Myanmar when their relative cost 
increased more than could have been predicted at the outset. The unexpected increase 
of the cost was partly because the sender states increased the sanctions incrementally 
over a large period of time, but it was equally important that sanctions indirectly 
affected Myanmar through forcing it into a closer relationship with its neighbouring 
states, particularly China. The increasing Chinese dominance in Myanmar decreased 
the benefits of status quo to the point where it was rational to comply with the 
Western demands. The Myanmar government consolidated its power through political 
reforms, which made it possible for them to comply with demands without sacrificing 
their security. I term the effect of sanctions an unforeseen success, because neither the 
sender states nor the target could have predicted the increased relative cost of 
sanctions through the indirect effects. 
The findings of this thesis suggest that it would be useful to extend the sanctions 
theory by including indirect effects of sanctions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 
Myanmar has been a target of comprehensive international sanctions since the end of 
the Cold War. The sanctions were imposed in response to grave human rights 
violations.1 The most extensive sanctions were imposed by Western countries. The 
Western governments demanded major political and human rights improvements in 
return for lifting these sanctions. These demands included freeing political prisoners, 
ending the practice of forced labour and respecting the results of the 1990 elections, 
when the military government lost to the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by 
Aung San Suu Kyi.  
For many years Myanmar resisted these demands. However, after Thein Sein was 
elected president by the newly elected National Assembly in March 2011, his 
government undertook many of the changes that had been demanded. The human rights 
situation improved in compliance with Western demands. Hundreds of political 
prisoners have been released, including Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition leaders. 
The country has successfully held fair and free supplementary elections to parliament, 
and Aung San Suu Kyi was among those elected. In addition, the army’s use of forced 
labour and child labour has decreased, and pre-publication censorship of the media has 
stopped. Most international sanctions against the country have been lifted in response 
to these changes. This thesis seeks to answer the question: 
Were the political changes in Myanmar caused by the EU and US sanctions? 
It focuses on the economic and political sanctions imposed by the Western powers; the 
European Union and the United States. 2  This is because they imposed the most 
                                              
1The military regime changed the English name of the country from the colonial name Burma to 
Myanmar in 1989. The UN recognises the new name, but the Myanmar political opposition and some 
organisations and countries continue to use the old name. For simplicity, I use the name Myanmar for 
the country throughout the period, except when Burma is used in direct quotes. This is without 
political intent.  
2 Western powers in this thesis mean the European Union and the United States. While I refer to the 
differences between the European Union and the United States at many points throughout the thesis, I 
shall differentiate between the two only when their policies differ. When actions taken by the two 
powers were similar or had similar effects I speak of Western sanctions. The thesis considers the 
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comprehensive sanctions, and because they both have large economies and international 
influence that could increase the impact of sanctions. I conclude on the sanctions effect 
on Myanmar politics, and only focus on their impact on daily life in Myanmar to the 
extent it is relevant for analysis of their political effect. The political changes include 
both those occurring under former President Than Shwe’s rule leading up to semi-
democratic elections in 2010, and those that have occurred since the 2011 instalment of 
a nominally civilian government with Thein Sein as president. 
 
1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Despite the popularity of sanctions as a policy tool, scholars have in general not been 
optimistic about their effect in coercing policy changes. A number of both quantitative 
and qualitative studies assessed the effects of sanctions. The first major quantitative 
study on the effects of sanctions was made by G. C. Hufbauer, Jeffrey J Schott and 
Kimberly Ann Elliott in 1985 and updated in 1990. It examined all the cases of 
economic sanctions they could identify to date. They concluded that sanctions had 
positive effects in 34% of the 116 cases examined (Hufbauer et al. 1990: 93). However, 
when re-examining their data set, Robert A. Pape (1997) lowered the estimated success 
rate to less than 5%. The remaining success cases, Pape argued, could be credited to 
factors such as the threat of military action. 
The focus in sanctions research has expanded to under what circumstances they can 
have an effect. Pape (1997) concluded that sanctions can be effective in cases where 
modest policy goals are sought; when the targeted state has little to lose from adapting 
to the demands of the sender states. Dragan Miljkovic (2002) expanded on this. He 
conducted a quantitative study based on interviews with experts in the field to assess 
which conditions they consider necessary for sanctions to be effective. The study found 
a consensus on six conditions for sanction effectiveness: 
                                              
European Union as a unitary actor because its member states agreed to align their policies towards the 
country. While some EU member states imposed additional sanctions, this was also the case of some 
US states. I will use the term European Union about the union for the whole time period, even though it only 
adopted that name in 1993.  
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1. Modest policy change is sought, 
2. Sanctions are comprehensive; i.e. both trade and financial sanctions are imposed, 
3. The target does not receive significant support from a third party, 
4. The sender has much greater economy than the target, 
5. There is international co-operation in the imposition of sanctions, 
6. The target is economically and politically weak and unstable  
(Miljkovic, 2002: 1) 
Dursun Peksen and A. Cooper Drury (2009) have analysed side-effects of sanctions for 
more comprehensive conclusions of their effects. In a quantitative study, they look at 
the effect sanctions have on the politics of the sanctioned country. They concluded that 
sanctions have generally worsened the targeted government’s respect for human rights 
and democratic freedoms, such as freedom from extrajudicial killings, torture and 
imprisonment. Their studies show that “economic coercion unintentionally creates 
conditions that permit the leadership in target countries to consolidate its hold on power 
and increase the use of political repression” (Peksen and Drury, 2009: 395).  
There is a discrepancy between the popularity sanctions have gained since the end of 
the Cold War and researchers’ findings regarding their effectiveness as a tool in 
international politics. Why are sanctions still used as a policy tool when studies largely 
fail to identify positive outcomes? There are two different explanations for this. Firstly, 
James M. Lindsay (1986) and Francesco Giumelli (2011) have both concluded that 
sanctions are not always imposed in order to make changes in the target country. They 
can have different objectives, and in most cases their primary function is to send a signal. 
Through sanctions, a government can demonstrate to domestic constituencies and 
foreign observers that it is tough on human rights violators. Johan Galtung claimed that 
the criteria for success in cases of sanctions are not as strict as with other policy choices. 
Even if sanctions have no effect on a state’s policies, “there is at least the gratification 
that derives from knowing (or believing) that the sinner gets his due, that the criminal 
has been punished” (Galtung 1967: 380f). Thus, a state can impose sanctions as a means 
to improving its reputation as someone dedicated to human rights. 
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The second group of researchers employ a game theoretical perspective. Daniel W. 
Drezner (2003) questioned that states would impose sanctions with only a minimal 
chance of success. As states are rational actors, they would only choose a relatively 
costly policy like sanctions if the benefits were likely to outweigh the costs. He held 
that the negative reputation sanctions have acquired in research is in fact a result of 
selection bias. Drezner holds that imposed sanctions are the result of the threat of 
sanctions failing. Thus, all threats of sanctions should be analysed in order to conclude 
on the tool’s effectiveness, not only those that end with imposed sanctions. Sanctions 
are always preceded by implicit or explicit threats, and sanctions are only imposed when 
the target state fails to comply with these threats. If the sender state fails to impose 
sanctions when a threat of sanctions has failed, similar threats will lose credibility in 
the future. This explains why rational states impose sanctions even if they are aware of 
their limited chance of success. 
In cases of imposed sanctions, the target state has already considered the costs and 
benefits of both compliance and sanctions, and found that their preferred outcome is 
imposed sanctions. They are therefore not likely to have an effect once imposed. Jon 
Hovi, Robert Huseby and Detlef E. Sprinz (2005) expand on this by adding that imposed 
sanctions can be effective if the target had incomplete information about the sanctions 
and therefore failed to make a cost-optimal decision before the sanctions were imposed.  
This thesis is not the first study examining the effects of sanctions in the case of 
Myanmar. The case of Myanmar, as most researched cases of sanctions, is one of 
imposed sanctions. Kaukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 203) defines sanctions as a 
policy instrument with the objective of bringing about change in the activities or 
policies of third states, individuals from third states or non-state entities […]. Measures 
undertaken include specific or general trade restrictions […] suspension of cooperation 
with a third country, arms embargos, interruption or restriction of diplomatic relations 
and travel or visa bans. 
 
This definition includes political measures in addition to the trade barriers of purely 
economic sanctions, and thus fit well with the case of EU and US sanctions against 
Myanmar. During the years of sanctions, a range of researchers have analysed this case. 
As in the research on the success of sanctions in general, the assessment of their effect 
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in Myanmar were overwhelmingly negative. Research titles like “US Sanctions against 
Burma: A Failure on All Fronts” (Hadar, 1998), “Myanmar: Sanctions Won’t Work” 
(Sachs, 2004) and “Destroying a country in order to save it: The folly of economic 
sanctions against Myanmar” (Rarick, 2006) illustrate the dominating view among 
researchers. There are no positive predictions to balance out this lack of faith in the 
literature. 
These scholars made their analyses during the sanction years, and did not foresee the 
political changes in Myanmar since the 2010 national elections. This thesis seeks to 
contribute to the debate on sanctions with a re-evaluation of their effect in Myanmar in 
light of recent developments, applying the theoretical framework Hovi et al. developed 
in their 2005 study of the effect of imposed economic sanctions. Instead of attempting 
to predict the future, this thesis analyses past events to consider the effect of sanctions 
in Myanmar. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
1.3.1 Theory 
In the case examined in this thesis, a target state – Myanmar – has changed its policies 
in a way that has largely satisfied the demands of the sender states. Although not all 
demands have been met, the progress has been substantial enough for the sender states 
to choose to lift or suspend most sanctions. As pointed out by Lindsay, however, that 
is not enough to declare the sanctions a success. 
To consider sanctions aimed at compliance a success, they must meet two criteria. 
First, the target must alter its behaviour to conform with the initiator’s preferences. 
Second, the target must change its policies because of the sanctions. (Lindsay 1986: 
158)  
 
For the sanctions to be considered effective, it must be proved likely that there is a 
causal relationship between the sanctions and the reforms. This thesis will apply rational 
choice theory in order to isolate this potential causal relationship between sanctions and 
reforms. This theory is well suited for explaining compliance schemes.  
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Rational choice theory sees states as rational actors, who have consistent preferences 
and aim to maximise net benefits of their policy-making. States use sanctions in order 
to alter the balance of costs and benefits in another state, to make it rational for the 
target to adapt to the sender state’s demands. By threatening with sanctions, the sender 
can increase the cost of the target’s preferred policy choice, thus altering its incentives. 
If the cost of sanctions outweighs the benefit the state would get from continuing to 
pursue its preferred policy alternative, it will be rational for the target to comply. If the 
cost of sanctions are lower than the benefits of status quo on the other hand, the 
sanctions will fail – assuming that the target has complete information. If I am unable 
to find that the cost of sanctions outweighed the cost of compliance in the case of 
Myanmar, this will weaken the argument that sanctions were effective in compelling 
the Myanmar government to reform.  
The analysis is structured around three hypotheses. I have developed the hypotheses 
from Hovi et al. (2005), who apply a rational choice method in order to identify how 
imposed sanctions can be effective. Daniel Drezner (2003) held that sanctions are 
primarily effective at the threat stage, before they are imposed. As he pointed out, 
sanctions have to be imposed when threats have failed, in order to lend legitimacy to 
similar threats in the future. However, when sanctions are imposed they have already 
failed as a policy tool. Hovi et al. (2005) agree that sanctions are primarily effective 
before they are imposed, but propose some scenarios in which sanctions can be 
effective in coercing change after they are imposed. 
If sanctions against Myanmar succeeded, it must be because Myanmar lacked 
complete information when threatened with sanctions and therefore failed to correctly 
assess their relative costs. In that case, the target will respond when the mistake is 
identified by complying with the sender state’s demands. Hovi et al. have identified 
three different scenarios in which sanctions can have an effect even after they have 
been imposed. These are based on different mistakes the target state can make in 
analysing the relative cost of the threatened sanctions.  The hypotheses I examine are 
developed from these scenarios, and this thesis considers how the case of Myanmar 
fits with each. These hypotheses provide a tool to systematise the effects of sanctions. 
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The first scenario is that the threat of sanctions fails because the target state 
underestimates the sender state’s determination to impose or maintain sanctions. When 
the target state realises the mistake, it will modify its behaviour and comply. The second 
scenario is that the target state underestimates the costs of the sanctions. In this case, it 
will usually take longer to identify the mistake, as the full cost of sanctions can only 
become clear over time. Either sanctions can get more comprehensive with time, or the 
costs can be manageable in the short term but too costly in the long term. When the 
mistake is identified, the target will comply. The last scenario is that the target state 
initially fails to respond to the threats because it expects the sender state to impose 
sanctions regardless of its actions. If the target state believes that the sanctions will be 
imposed and maintained even if it complies, it will not have an incentive to comply 
even if the cost of sanctions is high. If it is made clear to the target state that the sanctions 
will be lifted if it complies, this can lead to compliance after the sanctions are imposed. 
These scenarios provide the basis for my hypotheses, which will be confronted with 
empirical evidence in Chapters 3-5:  
H1: The threat of sanctions failed because Myanmar underestimated the 
credibility of the threat of sanctions. The government adapted to the demands 
when sanctions were imposed and it understood that they would remain. 
H2. The threat of sanctions failed because the Myanmar government 
underestimated their costs. Sanctions were eventually successful as the Myanmar 
regime realised that their cost outweighed the benefits of non-compliance. 
H3. The threat of sanctions failed because Myanmar believed the sender states 
would impose and uphold sanctions regardless of its response to the threats. 
Sanctions became effective when the government was convinced that the sanctions 
would be lifted if Myanmar complied with the demands. 
These hypotheses provide a method to systematically assess the effects of sanctions 
from the effect of other potential causal factors in the case of Myanmar.  
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1.3.2 Methods 
This thesis examines the effects of sanctions on Myanmar. As seen above, a number 
of both quantitative and qualitative studies have previously sought to identify it. Using 
a case study method in this thesis allows me to do an in-depth analysis. As defined by 
Yin (2009: 18) 
A case study method is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. 
 
This makes it a suitable method for examining events in Myanmar. The quantitative 
studies mentioned above predict that imposed sanctions in general fail to bring change 
in the target state. In Myanmar, reforms were implemented after a sustained period of 
Western sanctions, and sanctions were lifted in response to the reforms. The fact that 
the effect of sanctions in this case can seem to diverge from general theory makes it 
worthy of closer examination. Considering the context to the developments in 
Myanmar is necessary in order to assess whether this is a – relatively rare – case of 
compliance. As sanctions was only one of several factors of influence to Myanmar, 
any consideration of its relative effect will have to take into account its context. The 
case study method allows me to examine the actions and effects of the sender state, 
the target state, and the external circumstances influencing the parties. 
A limitation of a case study method is primarily that it suffers from low external 
validity; the conclusions from one study may not be representative for other cases of 
sanctions (Gerring 2007: 43). However, the aim of this thesis is to test existing theory 
on the effect of imposed sanctions to see whether it fits with the case of Myanmar. 
Thus, it is a supplement to existing research, and aims at testing existing theory rather 
than generating new theory. The case study method allows this close examination of 
the case of Myanmar, which makes it possible to separate the particular effect of 
sanctions from that of other factors. As this is the aim, it is crucial to strengthen the 
internal validity of the study; that the causal relationships identified. The three 
hypotheses that the analysis is structured around allow me to consider a number of 
factors that have potentially influenced the case. 
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1.3.3 Data 
The analysis in this thesis is primarily based on published sources. The sanctions against 
Myanmar have been in place for a long time, and most aspects of the case are well 
documented. However, I supplement these sources with three interviews conducted 
with experts on Myanmar, in order to get their opinions about the reasons for the 
political changes in Myanmar and the role of sanctions. I have interviewed Richard 
Horsey, an NGO worker with long experience in the country. His background is 
primarily the International Labour Organisation. Further, I have interviewed Kyi Kyi 
Nyein, a Myanmar businesswoman who experienced the sanctions from the target side 
during the whole period of sanctions. Finally, I have interviewed Dr. Min Zaw Oo, a 
Myanmar academic who has returned from exile in the United States to work for the 
state-run Myanmar Peace Center. While in exile, he was part of the group that designed 
the US sanctions against Myanmar. The process of change is still ongoing, and 
interviews were a way to get the most recent analysis from key people on the subject. I 
found that my interviewees could provide me with insights into various sides of the 
situation that I was not able to find in existing publications.  
I conducted the interviews in Yangon, Myanmar, on May 23-25, 2013. Those 
interviewed had great insight into diverse, though related, aspects of my research 
question. Therefore, I chose to ask general, open-ended questions allowing them to 
expand on their knowledge and opinions about the effect of sanctions. As I was 
interested in their expert opinions, I found this a more valuable approach than 
conducting more structured interviews. 
I have only to a small extent had access to information about meetings between 
representatives of the Western powers and Myanmar during the years of sanctions. I 
have gained some information about the US-Myanmar diplomatic relations through a 
confidential document published by Wikileaks, but I do not have information about any 
unofficial EU-Myanmar relations. Therefore, it has been necessary to rely on those who 
claim that these relations were very limited. It is possible that proof of secret Western-
Myanmar negotiations emerge later on. If so, my conclusion may have to be amended.  
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The second challenge when researching Myanmar is the lack of official statistics. The 
country was closed off for a long time, and did not spend much effort on keeping 
statistics. Even the population number and their ethnic composition are disputed. 
Myanmar undertook a census in late March 2014. The problem with available facts is 
that many actors in the case of Myanmar have had an agenda, and even facts can be 
politicized. To the extent I have used statistics to test my hypotheses, I have carefully 
assessed my sources. Furthermore, I have made sure not to hedge my conclusions on 
statistics but rather used them to illustrate a point. 
1.4 OUTLINE OF THE PAPER 
The next chapter introduces the historical background for my case; developments in 
Myanmar. It explains how the country came to be a pariah state and a target of 
international sanctions, and the further developments from the time when Western states 
imposed their sanctions until the time when most sanctions were lifted in 2013. The 
chapter provides necessary information for understanding the rationale of the Myanmar 
regime and hence provides a basis for the subsequent analysis. 
Chapter three begins the analysis by assessing the explanatory power of H1, which says 
that sanctions succeeded when Myanmar realised the sender states’ determination to 
impose and uphold sanctions. I do not find support for this hypothesis. Myanmar had 
no reason to believe that the sender states would lift sanctions unless the demands they 
made were met. Further, if Myanmar did underestimate the sender states’ determination 
to sanction, it would have realised the mistake early on and not waited to comply. 
Chapter four considers H2, that sanctions became effective because the Myanmar 
regime realised that the costs of sanctions were higher than expected. This hypothesis 
is largely confirmed. Myanmar could hardly have realised the full cost of sanctions, as 
they were imposed incrementally and because they came to influence aspects of the 
Myanmar economy and politics such as its relations with its neighbouring countries. I 
argue that neither the sender nor the target could have predicted some of the joint effects 
of sanctions and other factors. Thus, I claim that sanctions had an unforeseen success. 
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Chapter five assesses H3. This hypothesis is that sanctions initially failed because 
Myanmar believed that sanctions would be imposed and upheld regardless of what the 
Myanmar regime did. I find limited support for this hypothesis before the reform 
process was underway, but argue the mechanism had some effect after the change of 
government in 2011. 
Chapter six concludes that sanctions did have an effect both during Than Shwe’s rule 
and during Thein Sein’s rule. However, Myanmar only introduced human rights and 
political reforms after consolidating their power to avoid the dangers of transitioning 
from a dictatorship. The effect the sanctions would have could, however, not been 
predicted by either the target or the sender states. The material impact of the sanctions 
themselves was not sufficient to compel Myanmar to change, but the sanctions had 
indirect effects that contributed to compliance eventually being the rational choice.  
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2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides the empirical background for the case of sanctions against 
Myanmar, by going through Myanmar’s history from independence in 1948 until 2013. 
First, it introduces the politics, economics and conflicts in the country that formed the 
background for the sanctions imposed from 1988 onward.  
Next, it examines the politics of Myanmar from 1988 to the elections in 2010, 
explaining how and why sanctions were imposed. Further, it looks at Myanmar’s 
economic developments in these years, to assess how much the sanctions could and did 
hurt the economy. Finally, it looks at the elections in 2010, and the period from 2010 to 
2013 when the developments in Myanmar during Thein Sein’s presidency led to the 
lifting of sanctions. 
 
2.1 1948-1988: FROM RICHES TO RAGS 
The ethnic and political tension in Myanmar was already evident when the country 
gained independence from Britain in 1948. In preparation for independence, an interim 
government had been established in 1946. This government sought to address the 
grievances in the ethnically diverse country by discussing some degree of federalism 
(Diller 1993: 394f). The government was led by General Aung San, who had established 
himself during the Second World War as the main leader of the struggle for 
independence. However, in 1947, Aung San and most members of his government were 
assassinated during a cabinet meeting. With the political elite gone before the country 
became independent, more than a decade of political instability followed. The attempted 
peaceful transfer of power to a self-ruling democracy failed, and “ethnic, political and 
territorial tension escalated” with independence (Callahan 2003: 114). By 1949, more 
than half of the army had mutinied, and the majority of Myanmar towns fallen under 
insurgent control (Callahan 2003: 114f). Economic development in turn slowed down, 
with governments having to focus more on law enforcement than on the economy (Myat 
Thein 2004: 18). In addition, the government laid a foundation for future ethnic conflict 
by increasing the emphasis on national unity in a Buddhist state. Prime Minister U Nu 
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furthered the role of Buddhism, and appointed the highest military leaders from the 
majority Bamar population (Cribb 2013: 6). 
Britain had centred the Myanmar colonial economy on rice export within a free trade 
system. The colony was considered an economic success story. However, the wealth 
was not distributed throughout the Myanmar society. By 1948, nearly half the arable 
land in the country was owned by absentee landlords, primarily Indian (Myat Thein 
2004: 14f). This system had turned much of the population of Myanmar into landless 
peasants, excluded from modernisation. Falling rice prices in the 1950s demonstrated 
the vulnerability of a system dependent on exports of a single commodity. Strong voices 
argued for nationalisation and industrialisation based on a socialist public ownership 
model. In 1962, General Ne Win took power in a coup d’état, introducing a political 
system labelled Burmese Road to Socialism. This combined import-led industrialisation 
with strict neutrality in the international system. With this combination of political non-
engagement, high tariffs, and prohibition against many kinds of trade, Ne Win went far 
in isolating the regime (Myat Thein 2004). 
The Myanmar economy plummeted under Ne Win’s rule. Following his introduction of 
a state monopoly on trading internationally, rice export decreased from 1.6 to 0.64 
million tons between 1962/63 and 1966/67. Rice farmers were required to sell rice well 
below market value to the state, who would then resell it on the international market. 
As the incomes generated from rice production declined, the system discouraged 
producers and increased poverty. As Myat Thein (2004: 85f) puts it,  
neglect as well as mismanagement of the agricultural sector led to a vicious cycle of 
stagnant or falling exports, leading to balance of payments and budgetary restraints, 
and further low investment, slow industrialization, and low growth [...]  
Failed economic policies resulted in economic decline, which aggravated the existing 
ethnic tension and political opposition. This in turn led to an increased dependence on 
the military to keep the unity of the state. Ne Win’s regime lasted until 1988, and 
Myanmar remained isolated, poor and conflict-torn. In 1987, he “admitted publicly to 
‘failures and flaws’ in the management of the economy” (Cribb 2013: 9), and 
announced reforms. 
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2.2 1988-2010: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND WESTERN REACTIONS 
The economic problems coupled with social unrest culminated in nation-wide protests 
in 1988, as the government attempted reforms. These started as a student protest in 
response to monetary reforms that left many people’s savings worthless overnight. The 
military cracked down on these protests, killing at least 50 people. As the news of these 
events spread, it sparked protests across the country. In July, Ne Win announced that he 
was stepping down. However, he appointed Sein Lwin, a general known for his brutality, 
as the next State President (Cribb 2013: 9). On August 8, the protesters launched a mass 
strike and nationwide protests. Once again, the government reacted to the protests with 
excessive use of force. Over the next days, an estimated 2000- to 3000 protesters were 
killed in what came to be known as the 8888 Uprising. On August 13, Sein Lwin was 
replaced by a more moderate general who released political prisoners and promised 
reforms, but this did not satisfy the protesters. The extent of both the protests and the 
brutality of the repression led the crackdown to attract attention both nationally and 
internationally. In September, General Saw Maung took power in a new coup, and 
crushed the protests (Cribb 2013: 9). In total, 3000-5000 protesters were killed during 
the summer and fall of 1988 (Bourdeau 2002: 45f). The new ruling body, the State Law 
and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), promised to hold democratic elections within 
two years.  
In September 1988, the United States reacted to the events in Myanmar by suspending 
all aid to the country, including the counter-narcotics program. In addition, they banned 
arms sales to the regime, including stopping an already planned delivery of arms. A few 
days later, the European Union suspended non-humanitarian aid (Peterson Institute for 
International Economics). This was the start to more than two decades of sanctions. 
While the 1990 elections were held as scheduled, the military government failed to hand 
over power when the National League for Democracy (NLD) won a surprise landslide 
victory. Instead, they arrested or placed in house arrest opposition leaders – including 
the presidential candidate for the NLD, Aung San’s daughter Aung San Suu Kyi. 
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With the memory of the 1988 police violence in mind, the international community 
reacted to this development with strong critique, and some with increasing the sanctions 
on the country. As the government failed to reform the political system and continued 
the crackdown on the political opposition and ethnic insurgents, the United States and 
the European Union gradually imposed more sanctions while downgrading their 
diplomatic involvement in the country. The US sanctions were more extensive than the 
EU sanctions throughout the sanction era, while the European Union generally waited 
longer before imposing sanctions and opted for more targeted sanctions. Sanctions were 
in most cases introduced after reported incidents of human rights abuse, in particular on 
military crackdowns on the opposition. 
Table 2.1: List of US and EU sanctions 
Year US sanctions Year EU sanctions 
1988 Ban on arms export 
Suspension of non-humanitarian 
aid, including counter-narcotics 
assistance 
Blocking assistance from the 
International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank, and the Asian 
Development Bank 
1988 Suspension of non-humanitarian 
aid and technical assistance 
1990 Ban on arms trade 
1992 Severance of defence links 
(military attachés removed from 
Yangon) 
1996 Visa ban for high-ranking military 
officers and government officials, 
and their families (expanded in 
1998 to include tourist and transit 
visas, and in 2003 and 2004 to 
include lower-level officials and 
those in regime-affiliated 
organisations respectively) 
 
Moratorium on high-level bilateral 
contacts 
1989 Suspension of Myanmar’s status as 
a General System of Preferences 
(GSP) state 
 
Withdrawal of Export-Import Bank 
preferential financing for US 
exports to Myanmar 
 
Withdrawal of Overseas Private 
Investment Cooperation financial 
services for investments in 
Myanmar. 
1997 Withdrawal of Myanmar’s 
preferential status as a GSP state, 
affecting trade tariffs for Myanmar 
agricultural and industrial exports 1991 Termination of bilateral textile 
agreement. 
2000 Ban on export of defence-related 
equipment 
Freeze of assets held in Europe by 
Burmese officials and regime 
supporters included on the visa 
bans list. 
1996 Ban on entry visas to the United 
States for members of the political 
and military elite and their families 
1997 
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Ban on all new US investments in 
Myanmar 
2004 Ban on new investments in state-
and military-owned companies. 
2003 Ban on all imports from Myanmar 
 
Ban on export of financial services 
to Myanmar 
 
Freeze on assets of the Myanmar 
military, government officials and 
institutions held in the United States 
(Pedersen 2008: 24) 
2007 Restrictions on exports, imports 
and investment in five sectors: logs 
and timber products, metals, 
minerals, precious and semi-
precious stones 
 
2007 Myanmar barred from receiving any 
form of U.S. assistance 
2008 Extension of the list of companies 
U.S. firms are prohibited to do 
business with  
 
Ban on imports of jadeite and rubies 
mined in Myanmar and jewellery 
made with such gems. 
 
Ban on banks providing monetary 
services to Myanmar 
Sources: Gaens 2013: 15f, Niksch & Weiss 2009, Pedersen 2008: 24, 34 
The sender states imposed sanctions incrementally, starting with a limited ban on 
weapons and some aid. Over time, the sanctions became comprehensive. The United 
States first introduced comprehensive sanctions with their ban on all new US 
investments in Myanmar in 1997 with Executive Order 13047, because of what the 
president called a “constant and continuing pattern of severe repression” (Hadar 1998). 
The sanctions were expanded with the introduction of the Burmese Freedom and 
Democracy Act (BFDA) in 2003 in response to the re-arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi after 
her release the previous year. The BFDA included a ban on all imports from Myanmar, 
freezing Myanmar regime affiliates’ assets in the United States and restricting exports 
to Myanmar. The European Union first introduced comprehensive sanctions with the 
2007 Common position 750, which blocked most imports and exports in central 
extractive sectors. This sanction was introduced in response to the SPDC’s crushing of 
the peaceful protests led by monks, known as the 2007 Saffron Revolution. 
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The United States increased their sanctions further with the Tom Lantos Burmese JADE 
(Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008, which was imposed in response to both 
the Saffron Revolution and the SPDC’s insufficient response after Cyclone Nargis 
struck the country in May 2008, killing an estimated 140.000 people (110th Congress 
2008, Turnell 2010: 25). The Tom Lantos Burmese JADE Act restricted imports of 
jewellery made from Myanmar gems and denied US companies to be involved in 
transactions with Myanmar companies (Martin 2012: 21). While the EU sanctions were 
less comprehensive than those imposed by the United States, it is argued that EU 
sanctions limited investments because investors feared bad publicity and withdrew from 
the country without being forced to by sanctions (Gaens 2013: 19). A notable exception 
in EU sanctions are sanctions on the oil and gas extracting industries (Gaens 2013: 19). 
2.2.1 The 7 Step Roadmap to Disciplined Democracy 
In 2003, Mary P. Callahan (207f) wrote that 
[…] today’s generals have barely been touched by the suspension of international 
economic assistance, the imposition of an arms embargo, and bans on new investments 
by U.S and European firms. […] All around them, Burma’s generals witness the 
crumbling of authoritarian regimes. But in Burma, military rule endures.  
 
The same year, however, Myanmar launched what was to become the first sign of 
democratic reforms. Khin Nyunt, Myanmar Prime Minister under Than Shwe, 
introduced a “7 Step Roadmap to Disciplined Democracy” in August 2003. This became 
the first sign of planned democratisation in Myanmar since the failure to respect the 
result of the 1990 elections. The seven steps outlined in this program were:  
(1) Reconvening the National Convention. While the National Convention that 
had been elected in 1990 never met, the government had created an alternative 
Convention which had first met during 1993-96.  
(2) A step by step implementation of the process necessary for the emergence of 
a genuine and disciplined democracy.  
(3) The drafting of a new constitution in accordance with the basic principles 
laid down by the National Convention. The National Convention of 1993-96 
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formed a basis for the future structure of Myanmar, including a provision that 
one fourth of seats in Parliament should be reserved for serving military 
personnel and that Presidential candidates with foreign spouses or children 
should be excluded (Cribb 2013). 
(4) An adoption of this Constitution through a national referendum.  
(5) The holding of free and fair elections for the legislative bodies, the Pyithu 
Hluttaws, in accordance with the new Constitution. 
(6) A convening of the Hluttaw members in accordance with the new Constitution. 
(7) The building a modern, developed, and democratic nation by state leaders 
elected by the Hluttaw and the government and other central organs formed by 
the Hluttaw. (Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung & Maung Aung Myoe 2008: 15) 
At the time, the 7 Step Roadmap was not considered a genuine attempt at democratic 
reform by outside observers, due to the dubious sound of “disciplined democracy”. 
Richard Horsey (2013 [interview]), however, claims that the term “disciplined” should 
be seen less as an expression of continued authoritarianism and more in light of the 
history of unstable, conflict-marred, politics.  
The 7 Step Roadmap was solely a plan for building the political structures necessary for 
a democracy. Dedication to the process did not mean that the government stopped 
reacting violently to protests. This was especially clear in 2007, when security forces 
cracked down on the non-violent Saffron Revolution (Gaens 2013: 7). This did not instil 
trust in the process of democratisation in the country. Still, without it receiving 
international attention, the steps outlined in the Roadmap were met one by one, on 
schedule. The November 2010 general elections marked the completion of the fifth step. 
 
2.3 1988-2010: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 
When the new government, calling itself the State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC), took power in September 1988, it introduced economic reforms to replace 
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the failed Burmese Way to Socialism with a market economy. It lifted restrictions on 
private sector participation in international trade in some goods, and introduced a law 
for foreign investments to attract foreign capital (Myat Thein 2004: 123) 
For a good while after the European Union had introduced comprehensive sanctions 
against Myanmar, EU businesses continued investing in the country. Unlike the United 
States, the European Union attempted to target its sanctions and thus did not go as far 
as to ban all investments. In the years 1995-2005, Europe was the largest investor in 
Myanmar, with twice the total investment of ASEAN (Gebert 2013: 4). With the 
European Union expanding its sanctions in 2007, it had a “substantial effect on the 
Myanmar government, costing it at least 288 million euro […] per year” (Gaens 2013: 
19). In 2010, Myanmar’s main trading partners were Thailand (the main importer from 
Myanmar) and China (the main exporter to Myanmar). The European Union was 
Myanmar’s ninth largest trade partner, but it only imported 3% of Myanmar’s exports 
and produced 1.2% of Myanmar’s imports (Office of the European Union in Myanmar). 
Myanmar was the European Union’s 144th largest trading partner, despite the colonial 
ties to Britain and Myanmar’s abundance of natural resources (Ikani 2012). Because of 
the stricter US sanctions against Myanmar, the United States was not one of Myanmar’s 
ten largest trade partners. The country exported $9.7 million to Myanmar in 2010, but 
did not have any reported imports from the country (United States Census Bureau).  
Myanmar’s growth rates during the years of sanctions is difficult to assess. The 
government reported double-digit growth rates during the years 2004-2009, while 
sanctions were at their most extensive, but this is disputed. Sean Turnell (2012) 
estimates - based on the country’s increase in energy consumption – that the annual 
growth rate between 2004 and 2009 was around 2 to 3 per cent, significantly lower than 
that of the other countries in the Southeast Asia region. 
 
2.4 2010: WHAT CHANGED WITH THE ELECTIONS? 
In 2010, President Than Shwe announced that he would arrange national elections in 
accordance with the 7 Step Roadmap, and the elections were held in November the same 
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year. While some parties were not allowed to take part and others decided to boycott 
the elections, some opposition parties did compete for – and win – seats in the national 
legislature.3 For the first time since 1960, members of the political opposition could 
take up the seats they had been elected to. 
Than Shwe resigned, handing over power in March 2011 to his handpicked presidential 
candidate – retired general Thein Sein. With him, a number of other ex-generals formed 
a new government. In choosing Thein Sein as his successor, Than Shwe managed not 
to repeat Ne Win’s mistake of appointing someone unacceptable to the public. Even 
though he had had a long military career, Thein Sein had never been involved with 
fighting ethnic insurgents or repressing political protests. Moreover, he and the rest of 
the would-be generals had been ordered to resign prior to the elections. While the 
election of Thein Sein was not democratic, and while the new civilian leadership were 
all newly retired generals, the new government was the first civilian government to rule 
Myanmar since 1962. 
To further ensure the new leadership’s capacity to rule as a civilian government, Than 
Shwe retired senior Myanmar generals who might have obstructed the process, before 
the elections. Seniority is an important basis for power in Myanmar, and by removing 
generals senior to Thein Sein he lowered the chances of the army overrunning the 
government (Horsey 2013 [interview]). 
 
2.5 MYANMAR SINCE THE 2010 ELECTIONS 
Within two years, Myanmar […] transformed dramatically from an international outlaw 
state to East Asia’s most attractive investment hub and to a legitimate power. (Gaens 
2013: 8) 
 
Myanmar has changed significantly since 2010. Only six days after the elections, the 
government freed Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest. The NLD was allowed to re-
register as a political party and resume its political work. In the following years, 
hundreds of other political prisoners have been freed, and a commission has been set up 
                                              
3 The NLD boycotted the elections, partly because of Aung San Suu Kyi’s continued house arrest. 
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in order to identify which of those remaining in the country’s prisons should be 
considered political prisoners and therefore be released from prison. In April 2012, 
Myanmar held supplementary elections to Parliament. The NLD competed for 44 of the 
45 seats that were up for election, and won 43 of them4. The government had invited 
foreign observers to observe the election process, and the supplementary elections were 
considered free and fair. 
Attempts at negotiating peace agreements with ethnic insurgency groups have received 
renewed attention, and most ethnic groups had signed a ceasefire agreement by 
September 2013 – some of them putting an end to more than half a century of fighting. 
The far-reaching censorship laws in the country have been relaxed, and the practice of 
pre-publication censorship of all published material ended on August 20, 2012. Banned 
media such as the exiled Oslo-based Democratic Voice of Burma were once more 
allowed (Bünte & Portela 2012: 2).  
The Western powers responded to these changes. In April 2011, before Thein Sein was 
instated as president, the European Union lifted its suspension on high-level meetings 
(Gaens 2013: 15). In December 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited 
Myanmar, and in January 2012 the United States restored normal diplomatic ties with 
Myanmar (Myers and Mydans 2012). The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, 
Catherine Ashton, visited the country in April 2012. During her visit, she opened a 
European Union Representative Office in Yangon. In 2012, Myanmar received a 
number of delegations from the Western countries, including US President Barack 
Obama, who visited in November. 
In further recognition of the changes, the European Union suspended sanctions for one 
year pending further improvements in the political and human rights situation (Tin 
Maung Maung Than 2013: 211ff). In April 2013, they lifted all sanctions except for the 
arms embargo in acknowledgement of the continued reform process. In the United 
States, the sanctions are more entrenched in laws and are not as easily lifted. However, 
President Barack Obama released a general waiver from the sanctions in July, 2012 
                                              
4  Of the last two seats, one was won by the opposition party Shan State Democratic Party (SSDP) and by the 
ruling United Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) 
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(White House  2012), which opened up for investments and trade in most goods. The 
arms ban remains against Myanmar, and in August 2013 Washington declared that it 
would also renew the ban on the import of gems from Myanmar. 
Some political issues have yet to be dealt with by Thein Sein’s government. As Western 
governments have focused much on the treatment of Aung San Suu Kyi in their critique 
of the government, the provision that blocks her from being elected president or vice-
president is one of the most notable. How the government will deal with this before the 
upcoming 2015 elections is not known. In addition to blocking Aung San Suu Kyi from 
becoming president (because she has been married to a foreigner and have children who 
are foreign citizens), the 2008 constitution entrenched a strong position for the army in 
the parliament by guaranteeing it one quarter of the seats. This also meant that the army 
got veto powers against amendments to the constitution, as these must be passed by 
more than three quarters of parliament. Moreover, it secured impunity for the military 
regime (Gaens 2013: 12). These are all issues of concern for Western governments. 
How Myanmar deals with these issues can have an impact on future Western-Myanmar 
relations. 
 
This chapter has explored the developments in Myanmar from independence in 1948 to 
the ease of sanctions in 2012/13. It has shown how ethnic and political tension resulted 
in a military coup by General Ne Win in 1962, who remained in power until 1988. His 
combination of economic mismanagement and repressive rule led to protests in 1988. 
The military crushed these protests leaving thousands dead, which prompted the first 
Western sanctions against the regime in 1988. The regime held national elections in 
1990 to satisfy the protesters demands, but failed to accept it when they lost to the 
opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi. More sanctions were imposed incrementally over 
the next 20 years, as the government failed to comply with the sender states’ demands 
and continued to breach human rights. 
In 2003, the Myanmar government launched the 7 Step Roadmap to Disciplined 
Democracy, which outlined the steps necessary for Myanmar to safely democratise. 
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Since then, the government have completed the steps of the Roadmap on time. In 2010, 
Myanmar concluded the fifth step of the Roadmap by holding national elections where 
opposition parties could compete for some of the seats. For the first time in fifty years, 
opposition politicians were allowed to take up the seats they had won, and in 2011, a 
more reform-oriented government led by retired general Thein Sein came to power. 
Since then, a number of reforms have been implemented, and the human rights situation 
for the political opposition and most ethnic minorities and have improved. In 2012/13, 
the Western powers responded to these developments with easing their sanctions 
against the country.    
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3. HYPOTHESIS 1: UNDERESTIMATING THE THREAT OF 
SANCTIONS 
As seen in Chapter 1, sanctions are primarily effective at the threat stage. Imposed 
sanctions are unlikely to succeed in compelling the target to change. H1 provides the 
first explanation for why Myanmar may have complied with the demands, despite the 
negative predictions for such sanctions: 
H1: The threat of sanctions failed because Myanmar underestimated the 
credibility of the threat of sanctions. The government adapted to the demands 
when sanctions were imposed and it understood that they would remain. 
This hypothesis provides a simple explanation for Myanmar’s initial non-compliance: 
the government did not initially comply because it believed that non-compliance would 
go unpunished. If this was the case, Myanmar would have realised its mistake when the 
European Union and the United States imposed sanctions. If the cost of sanctions is 
higher than the cost of compliance, the targeted state would move to comply to avoid 
unnecessary extra costs. In order to test this hypothesis, the chapter will be structured 
around two questions. The first is whether the case of Myanmar really is one of 
compliance to the sender states’ demands, or only one where reforms have been seen as 
compliance. The second is whether the Myanmar government introduced reforms 
because it found that it had underestimated the EU and US willingness to implement 
and maintain sanctions.  
Two factors make H1 improbable. The first is that, as Hovi et al. (2005: 486) argues, 
cases of miscalculated threats of sanctions are “few and far between”. This is because 
it takes time to impose sanctions. Thus, an initial miscalculation should normally be 
corrected before the sanctions are imposed. Because sanctions are most likely to be 
effective at the threat stage, a sender state considering imposing sanctions would not 
have any incentive to downplay the risk facing the target. The other reason is the 
duration of the sanctions against Myanmar. If the Myanmar regime’s non-compliance 
was simply a result of it underestimating the threat of sanctions, it would have been 
rational for comply already in the early years of sanctions. However, the hypothesis 
25 
 
cannot be discarded out of hand. Hovi et al. do not propose a time limit for 
compliance in a case where the target state has miscalculated the sender state’s 
determination to impose sanctions. Rather, they argue that  
A target holding such beliefs might be induced to reconsider once the sender proves 
its resolve by imposing sanctions, provided that the threat of continued sanctions is 
both potent and contingent. (Hovi et al. 2005: 486) 
 
Thus, it is possible that Myanmar believed that sanctions would be lifted even in a 
case of non-compliance. In 2012/13, most of the sanctions were suspended or lifted. 
This happened although not all demands on Myanmar had been met. If the case of 
Myanmar fails to qualify as a case of compliance, this means that sanctions failed to 
have the desired effect on the political developments in Myanmar.  
 
3.1 DID MYANMAR COMPLY WITH THE DEMANDS? 
As shown in Chapter 2, the Western powers reacted to reforms by easing sanctions. 
The European Union suspended its sanctions against Myanmar for a year in April 
2012, and lifted them a year later. In July 2012, US President Barack Obama waivered 
most commercial sectors wishing to do business with Myanmar. American businesses 
are thus in practice again allowed to do business with the country, although the US 
sanctions formally remain. If the EU and US restrictions were eased despite Myanmar 
non-compliance with their demands, then this hypothesis falls short of explaining the 
Myanmar reforms. 
Had Myanmar complied in 2012/13? While EU demands were vague, the US list of 
demands for compliance was long. It included a range of human rights and political 
reforms. Far from all of these criteria had been fully met when sanctions were lifted or 
waived. Further, the United States launched a policy of “pragmatic engagement” 
towards Myanmar in 2009, in part motivated by a wish to reduce Chinese influence 
(Gaens 2013: 20, 25). This happened before the elections, and before any of the US 
criteria had been met. Still, the United States did not lift the sanctions in 2009. Going 
through the status of the US demands one by one may get an indication of Myanmar’s 
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level of compliance with them by the time they were lifted. As the EU did not present 
Myanmar with clear demands, the level of compliance with EU demands is harder to 
measure. It will be considered briefly below. 
Table 3.1. The US demands for lifting sanctions 
 US demands for lifting sanctions 
1 Substantial and measureable progress to end violations of (…) human rights 
including rape (…) 
2 [T]hat the SPDC no longer systematically violates workers rights, including the 
use of forced and child labor, and conscription of child-soldiers. 
3 [M]easurable and substantial progress towards implementing a democratic 
government including –  
(i) releasing all political prisoners; 
(ii) allowing freedom of speech and the press 
(iii) allowing freedom of association; 
(iv) permitting the peaceful exercise of religion; and 
(v) bringing to a conclusion an agreement between the SPDC and the democratic 
forces led by the NLD and Burma’s ethnic nationalities on the transfer of power 
to a civilian government accountable to the Burmese people through democratic 
elections under the rule of law. 
4 “[T]hat the SPDC has (…) allowed humanitarian access to populations affected 
by armed conflict in all regions of Burma” 
Sources: 108th Congress (2003), 110th Congress (2008) 
When Thein Sein came to power in 2011, he stepped up efforts to sign ceasefire 
agreements with ethnic insurgents (International Crisis Group 2011). The success of 
this policy has led to a decreased conflict level in Myanmar. This has led to partial 
compliance with the first two US demands: that the State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC – the name the government got after a reshuffling of members of 
SLORC in 1997) made progress towards ending human rights abuses including rape, 
and that it no longer violated workers’ rights. Reports of army human rights violations 
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have primarily come from conflict zones. Rape has been used as a means of warfare 
(Brunnstrom 2014), while army battalions have used confiscation of land and forced 
labour as a way of compensating for insufficient funding (Steinberg 2010: 103). As 
conflict levels have decreased, and the SPDC increased army wages (Turnell 2010: 33), 
fewer reports of these breaches of international norms have emerged. As the 
international attention to Myanmar has increased, and as access to Myanmar has been 
simplified by new visa regulations, there is no reason why such reports would not 
emerge now as in the past without changes on the ground. However, the demands are 
not completely met, and in 2014 one report emerged claiming that the Myanmar army 
was responsible for more than 100 cases of rape in ethnic minority areas since the 2010 
elections (Brunnstrom 2014). While one such report may not be sufficient information 
to discard the success of the ceasefire agreements at this point, these had not progressed 
far enough by 2012/13 for it to be likely that the human rights violations 
institutionalised in the Myanmar army had ended at that point. Further, no reports state 
that they had, so even full compliance would have been unknown to US policy-makers. 
Point 3 in the US list is the most easily testable point. It is also the point most directly 
linked to political reform. I will consider all the issues it include, starting with the 
demand for releasing all political prisoners. While several hundred political prisoners 
have been released since the start of the reforms, some remained in prison until the end 
of 2013. Thus, in a strict sense, this demand has not been met. However, the release of 
political prisoners has been complicated because some political opponents were 
imprisoned under cover of having committed other crimes. President Thein Sein 
appointed a committee in February 2013 with the task of identifying remaining political 
prisoners so they could be released (Naw Say Phaw Waa 2013). Although some 
remained imprisoned, all the well-known political prisoners – the most outspoken 
activists and opposition leaders who arguably posed the greatest threat to the regime – 
had been released by the time President Obama waived the US sanctions in mid-2013. 
On December 31 on the same year, the Myanmar government announced that it was 
releasing all remaining political prisoners (The Telegraph 31.12.2013).  
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There is, however, some remaining controversy surrounding the definition of political 
prisoners. In 2011, Thein Sein’s government introduced a new law, banning 
demonstrations without permissions (International Crisis Group 2013b). Protesters have 
been arrested under this law, although they have received mild sentences compared to 
the long prison sentences of the previous era. Further, some religious leaders have been 
arrested for instigating religious violence even after the 2012, as mounting tension 
between the Muslim minority and the Bamar majority has complicated the political 
situation since reforms were implemented. These tensions have also led to serious 
violent incidents, with loss of lives, thus blurring the line between political prisoner and 
instigator of violence (International Crisis Group 2013a). The International Crisis 
Group, while pointing to the shortcomings of the Myanmar legislature on this point, 
hold that under the circumstances, “and with a crowded legislative agenda, it is 
impressive how much has been achieved” (International Crisis Group 2013b). 
Moving on to the next US demands, the freedom of speech, there has been progress just 
short of complete compliance. The release of political prisoners has helped support the 
freedom of speech – people are now less in danger of arrest if they exercise their 
freedom of speech. Further, opposition politicians who have won seats in Parliament 
have been able to ask direct questions and voice critique. This points to a changed 
attitude towards the freedom of speech, even though there has not been any law 
amendments to mark this change.  
Next, the government has introduced reforms to expand the freedom of the press. In 
2011, the government lifted the online censorship of a number of web pages for 
communication or spreading information, such as YouTube and the previously exiled 
media organisation Democratic Voice of Burma (Committee to Protect Journalists 
2013). In October the same year, the government released all imprisoned journalists in 
the country (Committee to Protect Journalists 2013). In August 2012, the government 
ended the pre-publication censorship laws that had been in effect for all publications for 
nearly half a century (Aung Hla Tun 2012). Developments such as these have led 
Reporters without Borders to rank Myanmar among the most free in ASEAN, although 
there are still some limitations to what the press can write about (Chongkittavorn 2014). 
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As was the case with political prisoners, extensive media reforms were not enough to 
fully meet US criteria because of these limitations to the freedom of the press. 
The freedom of association has greatly increased in Myanmar since the beginning of 
reforms. A turning point came when the government removed a ban on political parties 
before the elections in 2010. Further, in June 2013 the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) reported that over 600 unions had been formed in the country since 
restrictions on unions were lifted (International Labour Organization 2013).  
The question of peaceful exercise of religion in Myanmar is complex. While ceasefire 
agreements with ethnic insurgencies have halted ethno-religious conflict in the border 
areas, there has been increased tension between Muslims and Buddhists. Some areas 
have seen increased ethno-religious conflict during the reform years. While the 
government has not been considered the instigator, it has been criticized for failing to 
act swiftly and decidedly when conflicts turned violent: It has especially been criticized 
for not securing the rights of the Muslim Rohingya minority in Rakhine state. The 
government has refused members of this group citizenship despite their long history in 
the country, choosing to label them as illegal immigrants from neighbouring 
Bangladesh. When the government has responded to ethnic clashes between Buddhists 
and Muslims, they have been accused of “unequal pursuit of Muslim over Buddhist 
perpetrators” (Ohmar 2013). As seen above, however, there have been fewer reports of 
army abuse of ethno-religious minorities since the peace process was stepped up in 2011. 
The final point here is the transfer of power to a new government that is accountable to 
the people. The demand is that the transfer of power should be a result of an agreement 
between the military regime, the NLD and ethnic nationalities. The transfer of power 
after the 2010 elections was not a result of a negotiated agreement between the military 
and the opposition. However, it was at least on paper the transfer of power to a civilian 
government. The upcoming 2015 national elections and the formation of a new 
government in 2016 will further indicate whether the Myanmar has become more 
democratic. The political changes in Myanmar have meant that political parties are 
allowed, and that politicians from the opposition have been elected to parliament. Again, 
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despite major reforms, the expressed demands were only partially met by the time US 
sanctions were waivered.  
Unlike the United States who presented Myanmar with an extensive list of demands, 
the European Union demanded that the Myanmar regime made “a substantial 
improvement of the overall situation in Burma/Myanmar” (96/635CFSP 1996: 
paragraph 6). The developments listed here qualify as compliance with these demands, 
as the EU demands were not absolute. In spite of the failure of the reforms to fully meet 
the US criteria, I find it reasonable to consider the reforms as a case of compliance. The 
reforms took Myanmar in the general direction called for by the European Union and 
the United States, and made significant progress on all the points covered by the US 
demands. The European Union lifted its sanctions in recognition of considerable 
progress on Myanmar’s human rights issues. The United States has still not officially 
lifted its sanctions, and continues to demand full compliance. In practice, however, the 
United States have recognised the progress by releasing a presidential waiver which 
once again allows US businesses to trade with most sectors of the Myanmar market. 
Myanmar has gone far in complying with an extensive list of demands, and the Western 
powers have gone far in recognizing it. The rest of this chapter considers whether 
Myanmar complied as a response to the sanctions when they realised that the threat of 
continued sanctions was real. 
 
3.2 1988-1990 - THE FIRST SANCTIONS AND THE MYANMAR RESPONSE 
As seen in Chapter 2, the United States first sanctioned Myanmar for grave human rights 
abuses in 1988, by imposing an arms embargo. The situation that had escalated in the 
months leading up to the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) takeover 
in September of that year was one where a violent response to peaceful protests had led 
to more protests, which again were crushed with a greater use of force. The situation 
was chaotic. One can assume that the military and political leaders focused on internal 
affairs rather than on the international response. Further, the initial impact of sanctions 
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was limited, and did not take long to impose. In such a case, it is possible that Myanmar 
failed to realise the threat of sanctions. 
It is possible to see the decision to hold elections in 1990, for the first time since 1960, 
as a response to the sanctions. If the result of the 1990 elections were honoured, that 
response would have satisfied the sender states. However, the NLD was not permitted 
to take power despite its landslide victory in these elections. This was clearly against 
the wishes of the sender states (the European Union had joined the United States in 
imposing an arms embargo in 1990 (see Table 2.1). If SLORC planned to comply with 
the demands of Western states in 1988, any such plan was effectively abandoned when 
the democratic decision was set aside by late 1990. 
However, the developments up until 1990 can be explained without giving the sanctions 
a role. Even if Myanmar understood the cost of sanctions, these were a minor threat to 
the regime compared to the threat posed by nationwide protests and a general strike 
lasting for months (Peterson Institute of International Economics). While they may have 
considered sanctions as costly in the long term, the regime faced an even more serious 
and immediate threat. In the short term, they had a simple choice. Either they could 
choose compliance – which would lead to continued instability – or they could choose 
non-compliance and crush the protests to regain control. The immediate cost of this in 
terms of Western sanctions was little more than losing an existing arms trade agreement 
with the United States, the possibility of arms-trade with the European Union, and non-
humanitarian aid from the Western states. Myanmar had alternative arms suppliers, and 
political support from China that could compensate for the lost trade with Western 
powers. 
3.3 1990-2013 – MYANMAR’S RESPONSE TO INCREASING SANCTIONS 
The United States and the European Union imposed more sanctions as a response to the 
SLORC refusal to give up power in 1990. Since then, the Western powers introduced 
new sanctions incrementally over the next two decades as shown in Table 2.1. The 
sanctions were introduced in response to reported incidents of army violence and abuse 
of power, and reports on the general dismal human rights situation in the country. 
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Is there any evidence to support the hypothesis that Myanmar believed sanctions would 
be discontinued during these years without compliance? I have not found any. While 
the European Union has only a relatively short history of a common foreign policy, the 
United States has proved willing to maintain sanctions for a number of years. The most 
striking example of this is the embargo on Cuba that has lasted since 1960 (Drain & 
Barry 2010). Further, neither the United States nor the European Union had any close 
political or strategic ties to Myanmar. The country was not important economically, 
after the long history of Myanmar’s self-declared isolation. Imposing sanctions on the 
country was therefore not costly for the sender states, neither in the short term nor in 
the long term. Moreover, sanctions are generally considered an acceptable political tool 
for domestic audiences, compared to alternatives such as military engagement. Thus, it 
is unlikely that SLORC/SPDC calculated that sanctions were likely to be removed in 
the case of non-compliance. 
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has not found support for H1, which states that Myanmar failed to 
comply when threatened with sanctions because they did not consider the threat of 
sanctions or the threat of a continuation of sanctions to be credible. While I argued 
that this could explain Myanmar’s response in 1988 when sanctions were first 
imposed, I also found an alternative explanation: that Myanmar rationally chose to 
deal with its greatest immediate threat of internal instability before the long term 
threat of economic decline.  
This chapter has found that Myanmar largely complied with the demands of the 
sender states. If Myanmar’s compliance was an attempt to correct a mistaken 
judgement of the threat of sanctions in 1988, it should have managed to comply more 
quickly. A rational actor who has miscalculated the threat of sanctions will usually 
strive for compliance as quickly as possible. Postponing compliance will lead to 
unnecessary costs. If the Myanmar regime believed that compliance was in its best 
interest, it would not be rational to wait two decades to do it. H2 has been falsified and 
can thus not explain Myanmar’s actions from 1990 onwards. 
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4. HYPOTHESIS 2: UNDERESTIMATING THE COST OF 
SANCTIONS 
The previous chapter largely falsified the hypothesis that Myanmar did not expect the 
Western powers to impose the threatened sanctions. This chapter assesses the 
explanatory power of H2, the second hypothesis formed on the basis of the three 
scenarios Hovi et al. (2005) provide of cases where imposed sanctions can be effective: 
H2. The threat of sanctions failed because the Myanmar government 
underestimated their costs. Sanctions were eventually successful as the Myanmar 
regime realised that their cost outweighed the benefits of non-compliance. 
 This hypothesis holds that imposed sanctions could become effective, if the cost of 
being a target of sanctions turned out to be so much higher than the target state initially 
predicted that it outweighed the benefits of non-compliance. According to Hovi et al., 
a target state may just gradually reach this conclusion. Compliance with sanction 
demands will then take time. The hypothesis holds that sanctions were costly enough to 
pressure the regime to change, but that they did not succeed prior to 2010 because the 
government failed to correctly assess their cost. 
In Myanmar, it took 25 years from the first sanctions were imposed in 1988 until most 
of them were lifted in 2013. If sanctions were an important factor in the government’s 
decision to reform, then why did the Myanmar government not introduce sufficiently 
radical reforms to get rid of them prior to 2010? Evidence for and against this hypothesis 
can shed some light on the changes in the country. This chapter will explain the 
Myanmar government’s policy choices based on the changed conditions at the time 
when compliance finally set in. First, I look at how Western states imposed the sanctions 
to assess to what extent the costs were clear to the Myanmar junta. Second, I consider 
the rationale of Myanmar decision-makers in their reaction to the sanctions. This is 
intended to clarify the rationale for the military regime’s reactions to sanctions before 
and after their imposition. Third, I place the direct effects of sanctions into a context of 
other reasons for change. I point to indirect effects of sanctions, to check whether they 
influenced these other factors. This chapter concludes that H2 has some merit in the 
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case of Myanmar: The eventual relative cost of sanctions was initially clouded by a 
number of factors, and only gradually became clear to the regime. 
 
4.1 A SOFT IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS 
The design of the sanctions was not conducive to making the eventual cost of non-
compliance for Myanmar clear. In Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott’s comprehensive study 
from 1998 on the success rate of sanctions, they hold that sanctions work best if they 
are “forcefully implemented in a single step” (Hovi et al. 2005: 481). This was not the 
design chosen in Myanmar. Rather, the initial sanctions were primarily symbolic. The 
Western states then gradually expanded them to the comprehensive set of measures that 
existed by the time the Myanmar junta gave way to a constitutional government. There 
are three reasons why the initial sanctions in Myanmar had only a symbolic effect: The 
limited existing economic links between sender state and the target state; the target’s 
alternative trading partners; and the sender states’ reluctance to impose sanctions in a 
way that would hurt their own investments. 
When the first sanctions against Myanmar were introduced in 1988, the isolationist Ne 
Win regime had hindered international trade for over 25 years. Because sanctions were 
imposed just as this policy was being reversed, the trade volume was still limited when 
the sanctions were introduced. While the initial sanctions did not prohibit trade with 
any other items than arms, they discouraged trade through removing Myanmar’s 
preferential treatment as a trading partner and by condemning the junta. Thus, sanctions 
affected potential future trade more broadly. This effect was, and remains, hard to 
estimate.  
Furthermore, Myanmar had alternative trading partners that were not applying 
sanctions. In the short term, most trade that was lost with the Western countries was 
compensated for by increased trade with regional trading partners, as Myanmar’s 
transition to a market economy attracted investors from the region. The initial arms 
embargos imposed by the US and the EU only led Myanmar to import arms from Russia 
and China instead, and Myanmar’s international trade increased during most of the 
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sanction years. Dependence on regional trading partners led Myanmar to be hit hard by 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98, but overall trade increased between 1988 and 2011 
(Steinberg & Fan 2012: 208ff). Scholars researching sanction effectiveness have 
concluded, not surprisingly, that they are less likely to be effective if the target state 
“receives significant support from another state” (Miljkovic 2002: 1). Thus, little 
seemed to indicate that sanctions would have any crippling effect. 
The third factor limiting the shock effect of sanctions was that the European Union and 
the United States initially chose to apply sanctions in a way that would not hurt their 
own economic interests. Thus, they avoided imposing sanctions on Myanmar goods that 
were hard to replace by suppliers elsewhere in the South East Asian region. Investors 
in labour-intensive sectors such as the textile industry have low start-up costs and could 
easily relocate production to factories elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The Western states 
could therefore sanction these industries without attracting protests from Western 
investors; these sanctions would not entail significant costs for the sender countries. In 
contrast, Myanmar’s rich oil and gas reserves constitute rarer commodities that required 
large initial investments. Losing out on these markets would be more costly for affected 
Western businesses. Thus, the textile industry - creating many jobs but generating only 
limited revenue for the Myanmar government - was hit more harshly by sanctions than 
the oil and gas industries. Extraction of natural resources is capital intensive and gives 
large revenues to those in charge of the resources without necessarily contributing much 
to employment levels in the country. John L. Hammond (2011: 351) summarises the 
factors characterising oil production that limit the economic effects of oil production 
for the populations in states with oil and gas resources: 
Because [oil] is extracted, rather than produced, the oil industry is likely to be an 
economic enclave with few forward and backward linkages to the rest of the economy. 
[…] The high capital and technology demands mean that transnational oil corporations 
typically play a major role in production and distribution, further limiting its 
contribution to a national economy. Finally, as a capital-intensive activity, it generates 
relatively little employment. 
 
The choice of which sectors to target seems mostly to have been motivated by domestic 
concerns in the sender states rather than regards for maximising the impact on the elite 
in the target state. This went against the expressed intentions of the sender states. The 
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Western powers, and primarily the European Union, claimed that they targeted the elite 
specifically in order to hurt the people as little as possible. However, the chosen design 
limited the sanctions’ effect on the political and military elite. In reality, Myanmar 
became the target of a sanctions regime that hurt the people without significantly 
threatening the interests of the political elite in the short term. The incremental 
imposition of sanctions, the continued trade in central sectors and with some Western 
companies, the presence of alternative trading partners, and the limited trade between 
Myanmar and the Western powers were all factors that limited the shock effect of the 
sanctions. 
As sanctions were gradually expanded in the 2000s, their material impact became more 
noticeable. With the US bans on imports produced from Myanmar goods and on 
companies providing financial services to Myanmar, the sanctions increased 
transactions costs for Myanmar trade with third countries. However, this led to the 
emergence of a black market with goods routed through Singapore (Min Zaw Oo 2013 
[interview]). These black market trading routes were accessible for the elite of generals 
and cronies who had control over the economy, although the need for intermediaries 
increased the cost of trade. However, other businesspeople did not have access to such 
ways of accessing sanctioned goods (Kyi Kyi Nyein 2013 [interview]). Therefore, the 
sanctions continued to effect the elite less than others in Myanmar. This gave the elite 
an advantage as it limited their competition in the country (Min Zaw Oo 2013 
[interview]).  
According to Hovi et al., the cost of sanctions is only relevant insofar as it outweighs 
the cost of complying with sender states’ demands. If sanctions are comprehensive yet 
do not outweigh the benefits of the target state’s preferred policies, it can severely hurt 
the country without achieving the intended goal (Hovi et al. 2005). Thus, 
comprehensive sanctions will not work if the costs of compliance are high. 
Correspondingly, even weak sanctions can be effective if the costs of compliance are 
low. In other words, the nominal cost of the sanctions for the target state is not what 
determines their effectiveness; the cost relative to the cost of compliance does. The 
sanctions did not affect the regime much in the beginning but became gradually more 
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comprehensive. It is likely that the regime failed to assess the eventual relative cost of 
the escalating sanctions so they could correctly compare it to the cost of compliance. 
The next sections of this chapter will outline the relative cost the Myanmar regime faced 
with either compliance or non-compliance to Western demands. To do so, I identify the 
regime’s key priorities and assess the rationale for its reaction to sanctions based on a 
focus on securing these priorities. Then I look at the role of other factors affecting 
Myanmar decision-making, to show how sanctions affected them and how they in turn 
affected economic and political developments in Myanmar. I assess how these other 
forces for change in Myanmar influenced the relative cost of compliance, not least 
through lowering the benefits of non-compliance, of maintaining status quo. 
 
4.2 MYANMAR’S PRIORITIES: SOVEREIGNTY, STABILITY AND UNITY 
Certain priorities have been central for the Myanmar regime since Ne Win took power 
in 1962. I hold that the most central priorities in Myanmar are the need for stability, 
unity and sovereignty. These priorities are in line with the Realist assumption that states 
always have to ensure their survival as their first priority. I assess how the two decisions 
I examine in this thesis - non-compliance before sanctions were imposed and adaption 
to the demands from 2010 - fit with a regime acting rationally to serve those priorities 
and ensuring its survival. 
An underlying assumption of my hypothesis is that the Myanmar government acted 
rationally to pursue its interests as best it could. According to H2, Myanmar believed 
that the threat of sanctions was real, but that the sanctions cost would be lower than the 
cost of yielding to the EU and US demands. By this hypothesis, their initial analysis 
was that non-compliance would serve the regime’s long-term goals better than 
compliance. Further, that belief changed during the years with sanctions, eventually 
leading the government to introduce reforms.  
4.2.1 External threats to sovereignty 
Realist theories hold that maintaining sovereignty is a general priority for any state. 
This was crucial for Myanmar, where the government perceived the state’s sovereignty 
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as threatened by foreign powers as well as by internal unrest. After a long history of 
foreign invasions and struggles for power, the state had been a British colony from 1885 
to 1947. This experience, ending only forty years before the imposition of the first 
sanctions, led to wariness of following a dictate from Western states. Moreover, several 
states in Southeast Asia have a long history of fearing Chinese dominance. Balancing 
these two concerns provides an explanation for the Ne Win regime’s decision to pursue 
isolationism for the 26 years leading up to 1988, however destructive it proved for the 
Myanmar economy. This explanation also helps to shed light on the behaviour of the 
Myanmar governments during the sanction years. Former President Than Shwe 
expressed this concern, saying that 
once the sovereignty of our country is influenced in any way by others, it is tantamount 
to indirect enslavement under neo-colonialism. Hence the Tatmadaw [the Myanmar 
army] must ensure perpetuation of sovereignty at the risk of lives. (Gaens 2013: 23) 
 
4.2.2 Domestic threats to sovereignty 
Not only did Myanmar face sovereignty threats from foreign powers, the regime also 
faced domestic threats. The focus on preserving a united Myanmar favouring the 
Buddhist majority even at a great cost arose under Prime Minister U Nu’s 
democratically elected regime (Cribb 2013: 6). This contrasted with the Panglong 
agreement of 1947. This was a negotiated agreement between the Aung San interim 
government and ethnic minority groups that could allow for a degree of autonomy, and 
a right of secession, for some of the major groups (Tønnesson 2014 [personal 
correspondence]). This change of policy resulted in ethnic insurgencies upon 
independence, as ethnic groups found the promises of autonomy broken. Further, the 
new state was under attack by communist insurgents who later got support from China. 
This situation created a need for a strong role for the army.  
The failed attempts at democratic rule in Myanmar between 1947 and 1962 led to a 
belief that the conflict-ridden and diverse country would fall apart in the absence of a 
military government. The stability and unity of the country was once more seen to be 
threatened when countrywide protests broke out in 1988, and again in 1990 at the 
prospect of handing over power to a democratically elected party that lacked capacity 
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and experience in governing and that was not backed by the army. The survival of the 
SLORC, that had held power since 1988, came under threat by the unforeseen election 
result in 1990. Members of the junta risked punishment for their actions in 1988. Not 
only did they face the possibility of prosecution; it was also likely that the fragile 
stability of the country would suffer if the power of the army was depleted without a 
ceasefire agreement with insurgent groups. Thus, regime change could come at a high 
cost to the ruling elite, and potentially also to national stability. 
4.2.3 The cost of sanctions against the costs of losing an army-backed national 
stability 
Did sanctions threaten the regime’s basic interests? Sanctions were imposed gradually 
and focused on certain sectors. During the first years their effect was mostly symbolic. 
The sanctions hurt the international standing of Myanmar through denying the regime 
access to international forums, and decreased access to Western markets. However, they 
did not severely threaten the state’s survival. In fact, the government used the sanctions 
to create an image of an external enemy to enhance national unity: The sender states 
became a scapegoat for the economic problems, providing the government with 
someone to blame. At the same time as the cost of sanctions was low, the cost of 
compliance was high: the Western powers’ demanded major reforms from SLORC, 
including regime change. Over time, the relative cost of both sanctions and compliance 
would shift, but the initial sanctions did not give the regime an incentive to comply.  
In the 2000s, the sanctions moved away from a mostly symbolic implementation and 
had more impact. The sector most hurt by this was the textile industry. The export of 
garments had grown a great deal in the late 1990s, primarily to Western states (Kudo & 
Mieno 2007: 6). When the United States imposed sanctions on the textile industry in 
2003, US investments in the sector shrunk from almost $300 million in 2002 to zero in 
2004 (Kudo 2008a: 1001). The US boycott of imports from Myanmar caused an 
estimated 180.000 workers in textile factories – primarily women with few other job 
alternatives – to lose their job (Seekins 2005: 442). A Congressional Research Service 
report stated that   
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Several analysts indicate that many Burmese women who lost their jobs in the textile 
industry as a result of Western sanctions are among the victims of trafficking for sexual 
exploitation. (Liana Sun Wyler 2008: 15) 
 
While Myanmar’s abundance of natural resources made the country an interesting 
trading partner for its neighbours, it lacked a significant comparative advantage in 
labour-intensive sectors. Myanmar’s neighbouring states all have a large work force 
and relatively cheap labour available, so there was no real alternative market for the 
Myanmar workforce to replace the lost US demand for cheap labour (except through 
migration to Thailand). Sanctions thus came to have a real impact on the economy, and 
to have humanitarian costs.  
However, the reduction in exports stemming from the sanctions on the textile industry 
did not lead to a general decrease in the value of trade. This was because it coincided 
with an increase in natural gas exports to Thailand from US $114.2 million in 2000 to 
$1497.4 in 2005. The Western oil companies Total, Unocal and Texaco were major 
partners in these gas extraction projects (Kudo & Mieno 2007). Although US sanctions 
blocked new investments in the oil and gas sector as well as in other sectors, oil 
corporations remained in business during the sanction years. As seen in Chapter 2, EU 
sanctions never included the oil and gas extractive industries. Investments in oil and gas 
extraction yielded large revenues for the state through taxation, land rental and 
involvement of state-owned industry. Thus, while sanctions hurt the Myanmar 
economy, they did not threaten the regime’s survival even after they began to have a 
material impact.  
The direct economic benefits of trade with Western countries are obvious. As sanctions 
became gradually more comprehensive, the cost of not yielding to the demands of the 
sender states increased. In contrast, the cost of compliance was high from the onset. The 
European Union made vague demands for measurable improvements in the human 
rights situation. This would mean a change in the political system of the country, and 
limitations on the army’s hold on power. The United States went even further, with 
criteria involving a range of concrete political changes. In return for lifting sanctions, it 
demanded that the regime “no longer systematically violate workers’ rights, including 
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the use of forced and child labor, and conscription of child-soldiers”, that it make 
“measurable and substantial progress towards implementing a democratic government”, 
that it release all political prisoners, allow freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and 
freedom of association and religion. Further, it required the regime to reach an 
agreement with the Myanmar opposition on the “transfer of power to a civilian 
government accountable to the Burmese people through democratic elections under the 
rule of law” (Ewing-Chow 2007:157f). Even when the regime began to feel the cost of 
the sanctions, these demands were extensive and difficult to meet. Moreover, they 
remained outweighed by the cost of compliance as long as the regime’s own security 
would be sacrificed by complying. As seen above, security was one of the top priorities 
for the regime.  
Myanmar’s hesitancy to comply was no longer a result of low benefits of compliance 
like it had been when sanctions were primarily symbolic. When sanctions got more of 
an impact in the 2000s, compliance remained more costly than non-compliance because 
the military regime benefited from status quo. Therefore, the relative cost of sanctions 
remained too low to alone compel Myanmar to change. With the Western powers’ 
influence in Myanmar being small, any further increase in sanctions was likely to have 
a minor effect. The major changes in Myanmar’s cost-benefit analysis of their response 
to sanctions could come through changes in the international and domestic context of 
the regime’s decision-making. This next section considers alternative forces for change, 
to see how they interacted with sanctions to create the conditions for reform. 
 
4.3 SANCTIONS IN A HIERARCHY OF FORCES FOR CHANGE 
The direct effects of sanctions outlined above combined with other factors to create a 
situation where reforms became preferable to the Myanmar government. Sanctions thus 
had indirect as well as direct effects. This complex web of forces influencing Myanmar 
complicated a cost-benefit analysis, clouding the eventual total cost of sanctions relative 
to the cost of compliance. Gaens (2013: 14) has pointed to these forces for change. He 
concludes that  
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the Western sanctions regime, including the EU’s own “targeted sanctions”, did 
deprive Myanmar of international recognition and status, and furthermore resulted in 
an imbalance in the foreign presence in Myanmar. A desire to regain international 
status, attract more diverse foreign investment and expertise from abroad to rebuild 
the economy, and balance the presence of international actors in Myanmar can 
therefore be seen as a secondary yet significant driver for change. 
 
Figure 4.1 The path of influence of sanctions 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The diagram above is a simplified illustration of how sanctions directly and indirectly 
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which sanctions influenced the changes. Sanctions were not the sole cause of the other 
factors for change explored below, but had some influence on each of them. These 
alternative but linked factors are: Increased Chinese dominance/fear of China; ASEAN 
pressure; Myanmar’s need for economic reform, and; military support for reforms. The 
following pages explore the effect sanctions had on each of these factors. Hovi et al. 
(2005) do not deal with indirect effects of sanctions, but such effects fit with H2 in that 
they gradually added new costs for the government, thereby tipping the balance of the 
cost-benefit analysis.  
 
4.3.1 China’s influence on Myanmar politics 
China greatly increased its presence in Myanmar after the end of the communist 
insurgency in 1989. One reason for this was the fact that Myanmar followed the Chinese 
example in transitioning from a centrally planned autarkic socialist economy to a more 
market oriented system. Myanmar departed from its policy of isolationism just as 
sanctions were first introduced, and wanted trade and investments. Not just China, but 
India and the ASEAN countries as well, increased their trade with Myanmar after 
Myanmar shifted away from isolationism. However, the increase in Myanmar’s trade 
with China was greater than that with other neighbouring states. The development of 
China’s Yunnan province became especially dependent on raw materials and energy 
from Myanmar. The Chinese need for raw materials and the Myanmar need for trading 
partners and political protection led the two states into a “marriage of convenience”, 
despite their long held scepticism to each other (Shee 2002: 34).  
The increase in China’s role in Myanmar provides a basis of two very different 
explanations for Myanmar reforms, which I assess in this section. The first explanation 
is that Myanmar wanted reforms to balance out the Chinese influence over its economy 
and politics. The other is that Myanmar was encouraged by China to introduce reforms. 
Both these explanations hold that reforms were introduced in order to get the Western 
powers to lift their sanctions against Myanmar.  
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Table 4.1: Exports to and imports from China, 1988-2013 (US$ million)  
Year Imports from China Exports to China Total 
1988 114.79 140.83 255.62 
1993 164.83 324.66 489.49 
1998 62.04 518.86 580.90 
2003 169.53 907.71 1,077.24 
2008 647.54 1,978.46 2,626.01 
(Steinberg & Fan 2012: 209) 
Table 4.1 shows the development of official Chinese-Myanmar trade since 1988. In 
1988, Myanmar legalised border trade with China and the relations between the two 
countries improved (Steinberg & Fan 2012: 210). This was also the first year Myanmar 
was a target of Western sanctions. Table 4.1 shows two interesting developments in 
Myanmar-Chinese trade. Firstly, it shows a 925% increase in Myanmar-China trade 
during 20 years when Myanmar was a target of international sanctions. Secondly, it 
shows that the registered trade was increasingly unbalanced. Myanmar’s imports from 
China grew by 464% between 1988 and 2008, while exports to China increased by 
1305%. Chinese imports from Myanmar came mainly from the extraction of natural 
resources, such as timber, gems, oil and gas, and agricultural produce,5 while Myanmar 
imported processed goods (Min Zaw Oo 2013 [interview]). The decreased Myanmar 
exports in 1998 was a result of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, which affected 
Myanmar harshly because of its dependence on regional trading partners. 
This trade pattern forms the background for the first explanation about China’s role in 
the changes in Myanmar. Several researchers, such as Shee (2002: 38) and Steinberg & 
Fan (2012: 208) have pointed to the SPDC’s desire to resume relations with Western 
countries in order to balance the growing Chinese influence on their politics and 
economy. The Chinese activity in Myanmar led to only modest improvements in the 
Myanmar economy. Because of the practice of bringing Chinese nationals in as guest 
workers on Chinese-invested projects (Gaens 2013: 24), they did not lead to much job 
                                              
5 Table 4.1 does not include the substantive illegal border trade, which could somewhat alter the balance. As 
mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, it is hard to find reliable statistics regarding Myanmar. 
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creation. Further, some of the major energy and mining projects attracted negative 
attention domestically for leading to environmental degradation and forced relocation 
of locals (Kyi Phyo Wai 2002, Zu Tao 2012). Because Chinese projects received much 
negative attention, a case can be made that China over time was viewed less as a saviour 
and more as a destabilizing factor.  
Finally, Myanmar mainly exported raw materials and imported manufactured produce. 
Therefore, the value added of the exports was lower than would have been the case if 
Myanmar had processed its raw materials before exporting. The jobs from processing 
Myanmar raw materials were created in China instead. China was in a position to dictate 
the terms of trade because of a lack of alternative trading partners, which in turn was 
partly a result of Western sanctions (Kudo 2008b). Hence the cost of dependence on 
China grew in the eyes of the regime – which again decreased the benefits Myanmar 
got from maintaining status quo through non-compliance. 
This first explanation for China’s role in the reforms fits well with what I have proposed 
earlier in this chapter; that the Myanmar government’s perception of the costs of 
sanctions gradually changed. However, the regime did not only fear the material impact 
of sanctions. The strengthening links between Myanmar and China, which originally 
softened the blow of the sanctions, became an additional cause for concern and could 
be seen as a threat to Myanmar’s sovereignty. Myanmar depended on China both 
economically and politically as a protector against UN resolutions, and this left the 
regime in a weak bargaining position vis-à-vis Beijing. The Chinese dominance as an 
investor and protector gave it power over Myanmar political decisions as well as its 
economic decisions. The threat of Chinese dominance was especially acute because of 
China’s reputation as a destabilizing force in the country. Myanmar’s leaders had not 
forgotten how the Chinese civil war had spilled over into Burma in the 1940s-50s and 
how Beijing, up until 1989, had supported the communist insurgency (Kudo 2008b: 87). 
From a rational choice perspective, the cost of dependence on China and the instability 
caused by local resentment against the behaviour of Chinese investors and businessmen 
came to outweigh the benefits of having a friendly trading partner with a great need for 
Myanmar’s natural resources. This lowered the benefits of non-compliance compared 
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to the cost of compliance. The relative cost of sanctions thus would have become higher 
even without any further increase in the sanctions, because the benefits of status quo 
decreased as Myanmar’s valued sovereignty was undermined. However, this happened 
at the same time as the direct cost of sanctions increased because new sanctions were 
introduced, as seen in Table 2.1. The most notable increases of the sanctions came in 
the 2000’s with the US investment ban, BDFA, of 2003; the more limited EU 
investment ban, Common position 750, in 2007; and the US ban on providing financial 
services and on importing products made from Myanmar gems, the Tom Lantos JADE 
Act, of 2008. 
The build-up of Western sanctions and criticism against Myanmar further increased the 
military regime’s dependence on China, economically as well as in terms of political 
security. Western isolation and Chinese interest combined in decreasing the decision-
making room of the military regime, and also its sovereign territorial control. The 
expansion of Chinese economic involvement and the Western sanctions resulted in a 
situation that would have been hard to predict at the onset of sanctions. The benefits of 
compliance had initially been mainly economic. Over time, they also became a way to 
reduce Chinese dominance. The Myanmar regime, eager to protect its sovereignty, 
could now also benefit from increased independence if complying with sanction 
demands. 
The second, very different, explanation concerning China’s role in the process leading 
to compliance is that China encouraged reforms, i.e., compliance, because it was in 
China’s own interest to see the sanctions being lifted. Joakim Kreutz (2014 [personal 
correspondence]) and Steinberg and Fan (2012) have suggested that China persuaded 
Myanmar to reform in a way that would satisfy Western demands. While some Chinese 
business interests had benefited from Myanmar’s dependence on China since they 
avoided potential competition, the Chinese support for the regime attracted negative 
Western attention to Chinese policies.  
Moreover, Myanmar energy (in the form of oil, gas and hydropower) became 
increasingly important for China. The Chinese plans launched in 2000 for the 
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development of Western China, and particularly the development of Yunnan province 
bordering Myanmar, would benefit from a rapid development of Myanmar’s energy 
sector and infrastructure (Tønnesson 2014 [personal correspondence]). Thus, 
Myanmar’s economic performance became a more central Chinese interest. China had 
invested large sums into improving Myanmar infrastructure in order to facilitate trade, 
but could benefit from Western involvement in developing the country (Kreutz 2014 
[personal correspondence]). Steinberg & Fan (2012: 359) sum up these arguments: 
China wants two things from U.S.-Myanmar relations: China wants the U.S. to improve 
relations with Myanmar to the extent that China will no longer be criticised for the poor 
political record of [the Myanmar capital] Naypyitaw; and China wants U.S. investments 
to improve the Burmese economy and to share that burden with China.  
 
Joakim Kreutz (2014 [personal correspondence]) further expands on the argument of 
Chinese support for Myanmar reforms by showing how sanctions increased the 
transaction cost of China’s Myanmar activity. This was especially true of the sanctions 
imposed in the last half of the 2000s – affecting the banking sector and third country 
businesses cooperating with targeted business in Myanmar. After 2006, Western powers 
targeted any corporation involved in money transfer to Myanmar. As a result, Chinese 
investors had to go through intermediaries in Singapore to fund their projects. The 
sanctions imposed in response to the SPDC crushing the protests known as the Saffron 
Revolution of 2007 also affected China directly as they targeted third-country 
businesses involved in Myanmar.  
Moreover, Chinese products in Myanmar could increase their profits if the Myanmar 
economy developed, and opening it up to Western trade could achieve this. By 
encouraging reforms, China could obtain an economically performing and more secure 
ally (Tønnesson 2014 [personal correspondence]). China would benefit from being able 
to import, process and re-export Myanmar goods without risking to be targeted by 
sanctions. As an additional benefit, reforms and economic growth could leave Myanmar 
stable enough not to threaten the security of Chinese investments. Thus, sanctions in 
Myanmar became an extra cost for China, and Chinese policy-makers interested in the 
development of Western China found that the benefits of Myanmar reforms outweighed 
the costs (Kreutz 2014 [personal correspondence]). 
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These factors combined to create a compelling Chinese reason for urging the SPDC to 
reform. During the 1990s, China had itself been a target of Western sanctions in 
response to crackdown on protesters. As China refused to comply, they did not pressure 
Myanmar to at that point. By mid-2000s, China’s transformation of its economy had 
led to a much more open economy, and as shown above they could now benefit from 
an improvement in Myanmar’s reputation (Tønnesson 2014 [personal 
communication]). The argument that China encouraged the Myanmar reform process is 
supported by the fact that the first direct meetings between US officials and 
representatives of the Myanmar regime took place in Beijing in 2007 (Wikileaks 2009). 
The fact that China supported the implementation of the 7 Step Roadmap “as ardently 
as other states have opposed it” supports the argument (Steinberg & Fan 2012: 160). By 
this explanation, sanctions indirectly became one reasons for Myanmar compliance, in 
that they made it more rational for China to support reforms. As outlined above, 
Myanmar was dependent on Chinese support, partly as a result of the sanctions. 
Combining these two factors, sanctions had an effect both on the Chinese desires 
concerning Myanmar and on the strength of Myanmar’s wish to become less dependent 
on China. While the factors are different, they are not mutually exclusive. Myanmar 
wished to reform in order to reduce the dependence on China. Further, China came to 
support Myanmar reforms as it would also benefit from the sanctions being lifted – even 
though it would risk more competition on Myanmar markets. China had the economic 
power to punish Myanmar if it had been opposed to reforms and compliance. This 
would have heightened the cost of compliance for Myanmar. There has not been signs 
of China punishing Myanmar, even when Thein Sein’s government decided to suspend 
the building of the Myitsone Hydropower project that was to supply China’s Yunnan 
province with energy (Zuu Tao 2012). This points to Chinese support for reforms. 
Because Myanmar could reform without alienating China, the cost of compliance with 
Western demands was lowered. 
4.3.2 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) chose a middle ground between 
the Western powers and China when dealing with Myanmar. While the organisation 
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acted from a principle of non-interference, it was pressured by Western powers in their 
attempt to isolate the Myanmar government (Gaens 2013: 21). The European Union 
reacted to ASEANs decision to include Myanmar as a member state in 1997 with 
putting most of the political cooperation between the organisations on hold (Petersson 
2006: 564). The two regional organisations continued attempts at closer cooperation 
through the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM), and managed to increase trade 
significantly, but the EU pressure on ASEAN to change its Myanmar policies continued 
to complicate the economic cooperation (Petersson 2006). 
Through gradually expanding the sanctions, Western governments maintained their 
pressure on Myanmar. By defining Myanmar as a pariah state, they made it less 
acceptable for others to trade with the country. Through economic sanctions and by 
barring Myanmar’s access to international forums, the Western states maintained the 
image of the Myanmar government as illegitimate. Thus, they stigmatised Myanmar’s 
trading partners by association. This became more concrete when the United States 
began targeting businesses involved in Myanmar and monetary transactions to 
Myanmar with the Tom Lantos JADE Act of 2008. With the US dollar’s standing as a 
world currency and with the major companies delivering financial services being 
American, this affected investors in third countries wishing to trade with Myanmar. 
This increased the transaction cost of Myanmar produce, even to its neighbouring 
countries (Min Zaw Oo 2013 [interview]). The barriers posed by Western sanctions 
heightened the pressure on third countries like the ASEAN states to encourage 
Myanmar to change.  
It is, however, important not to over-emphasize the defining power of Western states in 
ASEAN-Myanmar relations. Within ASEAN, Thailand was most vocal in its critique 
of the Myanmar regime. The Thai attitude to Myanmar is better explained by the 
security threat a conflict-stricken neighbouring state posed to the country than by a wish 
to satisfy the European Union and the United States. As a reaction to unrest in Myanmar, 
Thailand saw a large influx of Myanmar refugees. Further, the Myanmar army crossed 
into Thai territory on multiple occasions, attacking insurgent bases there. Occasionally, 
Thai soldiers and civilians were killed in these operations (Cribb 2013: 46). In 1999, 
50 
 
armed student activists from Myanmar seized control of the Myanmar embassy in 
Bangkok, keeping tourists and diplomats hostage for almost 24 hours. Moreover, 
besides the military security concerns the unrest in Myanmar caused Thailand, the Thai 
government was also worried about the drugs inflow from Myanmar as well as its 
economic interests in the Myanmar energy sectors (Cribb 2013). Combined, these 
factors gave the Thai government ample reasons to criticise Myanmar and encourage 
reforms, without the added incentive posed by the trade barriers provided by the 
sanctions. 
Though ASEAN at times placed some pressure on Myanmar to change, the main effect 
ASEAN had on the country was to allow the Myanmar elite to compare their 
performance to that of comparable states. Myanmar’s political elite interacted 
increasingly with their neighbouring countries after Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997. 
This concrete departure from isolationism meant that the elite became more acutely 
aware of how Myanmar lagged behind its neighbouring countries. When the 7 Step 
Roadmap was launched in 2003, Myanmar had a lower per capita trade volume than 
any other ASEAN member state; even Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, who all 
transformed into market economies at the end of the Cold War. In fact, Cambodia’s per 
capita trade volume was more than three times that of Myanmar at that point, while 
Vietnam’s was more than five times greater (Kudo & Mieno 2007: 6).  
In addition to the example of the ASEAN as a group of economically more advanced 
countries, Indonesia proved a shining example of how to democratise and develop 
economically without sacrificing the privileged role of the army. As Gaens (2013: 11) 
puts it,  
[Indonesia’s] “controlled democracy” focussed on a strong, nominally-civilian regime 
with a heavy military component, and on development and economic growth. 
 
Representatives from Myanmar visited Indonesia from 1993 – five years before the fall 
of President Suharto - onwards, to study its political developments. In Indonesia, the 
strong role for the army was enshrined in the constitution and the army retained political 
power even after the country became an electoral democracy. There are clear 
similarities between these political developments and with the political system under 
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development in Myanmar today (Gaens 2013). ASEAN thus provided Myanmar with 
an example to adhere to in more ways than one. The prospect of economic growth rates 
similar to its neighbouring countries put additional pressure on the state to change, while 
the political process in Indonesia provided an example for how it could be done at an 
acceptable cost to the military. This was important in changing the government’s view 
on the necessity of reforms (Gaens 2013, Horsey 2013 [interview]). 
The ASEAN-Myanmar relationship was influenced by the Western powers, especially 
the European Union because of the pressure it placed on ASEAN during the EU- 
ASEAN trade negotiations. While this did not stop ASEAN from admitting Myanmar 
as a member state, it was most likely influential in ASEAN’s pressure to persuade 
Myanmar to abstain from chairing the organisation when its turn came in 2006. 
However, as the ASEAN critique was as limited as it was, the other role ASEAN played 
in Myanmar – providing examples of Southeast Asian development – is likely to have 
had more importance for the SPDC’s decision to reform. This was not an effect of 
sanctions. However, it increased the SPDC’s perceived cost of non-compliance, and 
thus, had an effect on the relative cost of sanctions. 
4.3.3 Myanmar’s need for economic reform: Barriers to international trade 
Sanctions set barriers to trade with Western countries, and to a lesser extent to 
Myanmar’s trade with third countries. Economic and political reforms in Myanmar 
could lead to an improved international reputation and to an end to sanctions, but this 
was not the only potential benefit of reforms. Trade was also impeded by domestic 
economic policies. These would limit foreign investments even in the absence of 
externally enforced sanctions, as they made investing in Myanmar risky. First, the 
country retained remnants of their pre-1988 centrally planned economic system. The 
government controlled the trade flow in some sectors and treated state-owned 
businesses preferentially (Kudo & Mieno 2007). This discouraged foreign direct 
investments. Weak legislation on investments increased the risk of investing. In 
addition, the state owned all land. Foreign companies could not buy land, and risked 
nationalisation of their businesses.  
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Second, the government refused to change the official exchange rate that remained 
pegged at 6 kyats to a dollar despite an increase in the amount of kyats in circulation. 
This led to a large “shadow economy”, with an unofficial exchange rate of up to more 
than 1000 kyats to a dollar. Because registered international trade had to use the official 
exchange rate, it became much more costly than the unregistered border trade and 
damaged the country’s competitiveness (Dapice et al. 2011). This was a challenge to 
anyone wanting to do legal business with Myanmar, not just investors from the United 
States or the European Union. Myanmar could attract more investments by reforming 
its economy even if the sanctions remained, as the sanctions had failed to isolate the 
country. A further thawing of relations with Western powers can therefore be seen as a 
by-product of implementing economic reforms; they increased the cost of non-
compliance. 
Politically, the Myanmar military regime repelled investors who wanted to be perceived 
as ethical. Political reforms and an improvement of the human rights situation in the 
country could thus lead to increasing foreign investments regardless of sanctions. This 
cause for change is closely related to the Western sanctions policies, as the sanctions 
were instrumental for maintaining the picture of the Myanmar government as 
illegitimate. By imposing comprehensive sanctions on Myanmar, the European Union 
and the United States defined Myanmar as one of the countries it was most ethically 
problematic to invest in. This effect was clear in the European Union, where investors 
even in industries not targeted by EU sanctions chose not to invest in Myanmar to avoid 
bad publicity. To sum this up, the Myanmar need for foreign investments would benefit 
from reforms even if sanctions remained in place. The need to reform the Myanmar 
economic policies was an incentive to reform that did not depend on the ease of 
sanctions. While the lifting of sanctions would open up Myanmar to new markets and 
signal that it was no longer ethically problematic to invest in Myanmar, this was only 
one of the benefits of economic reform. Than Shwe’s initiation of reform was, according 
to Min Zaw Oo (2013 [interview]) triggered by “the recognition that the old [economic] 
policy failed”.  
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4.3.4 Military support for reforms 
Economic reforms could not have been implemented in Myanmar if the army had been 
against it. It would be risky to implement reforms contrary to the will of the military as 
the military elite was used to acting as the political elite. Such reforms could result in a 
coup, as President U Nu’s policies did in 1962. Further, in the absence of a functioning 
civil service, military leaders had to implement the reforms themselves. Support from 
the army was a necessary factor for change.  
Francesco Giumelli and Paul Ivan (2013: 28) largely dismisses Western powers’ 
influence over the Myanmar reform process: 
The choice was made within the ruling elite and, if external factors did play a role, it is 
likely to have been the overbearing political and economic presence of China and the 
lack of development compared with other ASEAN economies. 
 
These factors, however, relates to the other factors mentioned above: The army changed 
its views on how to respond to sanctions as a result of a changing situation in which 
their interests were better served by committing to reforms. The relative cost of the 
sanctions changed both because their absolute cost increased and – notably – because 
the cost of compliance decreased.  
Three factors influenced the military elite in addition to the sanctions: The pressure 
from, and example of, ASEAN, Myanmar’s bad reputation, and the weak economy. As 
the diagram shows, all these three factors were to some extent influenced by the 
sanctions. In addition, sanctions influenced the military leadership directly through the 
visa bans imposed on individuals linked to the regime, and through threatening their 
personal economic interests. As this section has argued, it also influenced the leadership 
indirectly by affecting the state’s foreign policy and economic relations with third 
countries who did not impose sanctions. All of this gradually led the Myanmar elite’s 
preferred policy alternative to change. 
There was a consensus about [the necessity of being economically reintegrated into the 
international community], so the expected push-back from the army didn’t materialize. 
Rather, the army was in the forefront. Because of this consensus that had developed in 
the minds of the political elite over years, the changes went much more quickly than 
Than Shwe and the world had expected. (Horsey 2013 [interview]) 
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The comprehensive sanctions threatened the business interests of army generals, and 
the bad reputation of the state was a strain on Myanmar’s relations with other countries. 
However, the military would not get the benefits of compliance if compliance led them 
to be ousted from power and prosecuted, which was not unlikely. However, the 7 Step 
Roadmap led the regime to consolidate its power through the new constitution. The 
constitution secured the military’s role through granting it one quarter of seats in the 
national assembly, the right to appoint the Minister of Defence, and the right to refuse 
to follow orders from the government if it threatens national security (Tønnesson 2014 
[personal correspondence]). Further, the ceasefire agreements the government signed 
with armed groups relieved the main threat to national stability. SPDC also increased 
its security by moving Myanmar’s capital to the isolated town of Naypyitaw in central 
Myanmar in 2006, away from the capital that had been a place of civil uprisings. Donald 
M. Seekins (2009: 69) write that 
a major reason for the capital relocation to Naypyidaw was the Tatmadaw officer corps’ 
profound fear of a popular uprising, which in 1988 was seen to pose personal danger to 
themselves and their families. 
The feared negative response to economic and political reforms from the army did 
therefore not materialise. Domestic support for reforms grew with the increasing 
understanding of the relative cost of sanctions, and the military’s consolidation of power 
meant that their cost of compliance decreased. With a new leader in power from 2011, 
the government could implement comprehensive reforms without the audience costs 
that could result from prime minister Than Shwe appearing to backtrack on his earlier 
policies.  
 
4.3 CONCLUSION 
The design of the EU and US sanctions – with incremental imposition – made it hard to 
predict the final cost. As the sender states gradually increased their sanctions, the extra 
impact on each occasion was not sufficient to force a change. Moreover, as researchers 
did not predict the negative effects of China’s influence on Myanmar’s economy and 
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politics, it is unlikely to have been part of any Myanmar cost-benefit analysis back at 
the time when the country first faced the threat of sanctions.  
The authoritarian regime had sufficient control over the economy to shift the costs of 
sanctions away from itself, so the cost on the elite remained limited throughout most of 
the years of sanctions. In contrast, the cost of compliance was initially high, as 
compliance could potentially threaten both the elite’s security and the stability of a 
country held together only by a strong military. Over time, the balance of costs and 
benefits changed. This was partly because sanctions became more substantial, but it was 
equally important that the cost of compliance decreased. The increasing Chinese 
influence over Myanmar decision-making reduced Myanmar sovereignty even in the 
face of sanctions, and increased contact with ASEAN demonstrated the growth potential 
of being integrated in the global economy. Further, the regime’s consolidation of power 
decreased the threat reforms previously posed to their security. 
Although this chapter has shown how the sanctions were not the only factor influencing 
Myanmar’s policy change, I find support for H2. I have not found any evidence to 
contradict or disprove it. The total costs of sanctions, including the costs indirectly 
attributed to sanctions, made it hard for the elite to pursue its preferred policy choices 
over time. As a result, the government implemented reforms in a way that satisfied the 
demands made by the European Union and the United States. This supports the 
hypothesis that the regime changed its policies when the relative costs of sanctions 
unexpectedly increased to a level where compliance became rational.  
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5. HYPOTHESIS 3: THE PERCEIVED INEVITABILITY OF 
SANCTIONS 
 
So far, the analysis has tested whether the sender states underestimated the threat or 
relative cost of sanctions. This chapter considers the merits of my third hypothesis: 
H3. The threat of sanctions failed because Myanmar believed the sender states 
would impose and uphold sanctions regardless of its response to the threats. 
Sanctions became effective when the government was convinced that the sanctions 
would be lifted if Myanmar complied with the demands. 
This hypothesis posits that the threat of sanctions was credible, and that the cost of 
sanctions would outweigh the benefits Myanmar would get from following its preferred 
policy choice. However, the Myanmar government believed that the sender states would 
impose the sanctions regardless of their response to the threats. Thus, it had no incentive 
to comply with Western demands until this belief was changed. This chapter will begin 
by testing the first part of the hypothesis. It will consider which criteria the sender states 
stated, and how the sanctions were imposed. The design of the sanctions and what the 
Western powers demanded of Myanmar open up for different interpretations of the 
actions of the Western states. Therefore, answering these questions can help answer the 
question of whether the Myanmar government believed sanctions were designed to 
produce change. The Myanmar government could not be sure that compliance would 
be rewarded if compliance was not the Western objective, and in that case there would 
be no incentive to reform. 
The second section of the chapter aims to explain the eventual changes in Myanmar. If 
Myanmar’s initial non-compliance was a result of a belief that sanctions were inevitable, 
a change in this belief could lead the Myanmar government to change. According to 
Hovi et al. (2005: 489) the target state can yield to the demands if  
[…] the threat is both credible and sufﬁciently potent and [if] after the imposition of 
sanctions the sender makes it unequivocally clear, via negotiations or a formal decision 
by an international body, that sanctions will be lifted if the target reconsiders. 
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Thus, to analyse this part of the hypothesis, the latter section of this chapter attempts to 
identify events that could have led the government to change its interpretation of the 
situation. 
 
5.1 DID THE SANCTION DESIGN MAKE THEM APPEAR INEVITABLE? 
5.1.1 Criteria for lifting sanctions: Unfeasible demands for change? 
The United States and the European Union pointed to similar reasons for imposing 
sanctions, such as a democratic deficit, army violence against civilians and systematic 
human rights violations. However, as seen in Chapter 3, the demands they made on the 
Myanmar government differed. The European Union formulated only vague criteria for 
compliance, while the United States gave clear instructions about what had to change. 
The EU demands left the union free to decide when Myanmar had changed enough for 
them to lift the sanctions. They demanded “a substantial improvement of the overall 
situation in Burma/Myanmar”, in which case “not only the suspension of the 
aforementioned measures, but also the gradual resumption of cooperation with 
Burma/Myanmar will be considered, after careful assessment of developments by the 
Council” (96/635CFSP 1996: paragraph 6). 
For the European Union, this was a way of leaving its options open. Without clear 
criteria, the European Union could decide for itself when it wanted to lift the sanctions. 
It would not be impossible for Myanmar to achieve ‘substantial improvements’. 
However, the government could not know whether their interpretation of the term was 
the same as the EU interpretation. Thus, they risked striving towards a goal that was 
more distant than expected. Lack of a clear goal may have negatively affected the 
Myanmar government’s incentives.  
With the United States, the situation was different. When they expanded their sanctions 
to get a real material impact in 2003, they came with an extensive checklist for what 
they wanted the Myanmar government to do (see Table 3.1). However, while these 
demands made it clear how Myanmar had to reform, they were highly comprehensive. 
It would be costly and time consuming for Myanmar to meet all US demands. Further, 
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the United States presented these as necessary demands, but Myanmar was not 
guaranteed that these demands were sufficient to satisfy the sender. This may have been 
true of the European Union as well, although the European Union remained less 
categorical in their approach to Myanmar. Even if the necessary conditions the United 
States presented were sufficient, the sanctions violate Miljkovic’ first condition for 
effective sanctions: that only “modest policy change is sought” (Miljkovic 2002: 1).  
The failure to meet this condition could make Myanmar question whether US policy 
makers were dedicated to coercing changes in Myanmar. Zakaria (2007) claims that 
“[w]ith countries like Burma, sanctions have become a substitute for an actual policy”. 
He criticizes how the United States and the European Union imposed new sanctions 
after each report of government crackdowns on protesters, despite their “dismal record”. 
(Zakaria 2007). If the Western Powers imposed sanctions to show that they reacted to 
news of human rights violations, they may not have been interested in the regime’s 
ability to meet the demands. If the aim was not primarily coercion, then Myanmar had 
no guarantee that they would reward reforms by lifting the sanctions. 
5.1.2 How sanctions were imposed – costs and benefits of unilateral sanctions 
Although multiple actors imposed some forms of sanctions against Myanmar, there was 
no co-ordinated sanction response. According to Miljkovic (2002: 1), sanctions are 
more likely to be successful if “there is international co-operation in the [their] 
imposition”. On the other hand, imposing sanctions unilaterally leaves the sender state 
more in control of their policies – the sender states were free to adapt or suspend the 
sanctions at will. Further, as the European Union opted for targeted sanctions while the 
United States opted for more comprehensive sanctions, co-ordinating the strategies 
would mean a trade-off for one or both actors. 
The choice of unilateral or multilateral sanctioning seems to be one between freedom 
and adaptability on the one hand, and increased likelihood of success on the other. The 
Western powers chose the least binding alternative, even if it violated a criterion for 
sanction success. Imposing the sanctions unilaterally lowered the cost by not having to 
coordinate a response. If the states had different ideas about how to succeed with 
sanctions, it makes sense that they were unwilling to cooperate in imposing them. This 
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also meant that actors were free to design sanctions in a way that would safeguard their 
differing economic or political interests. 
5.1.3 An alternative reason for imposing sanctions: Sending a signal  
Could rational states impose sanctions and not intend for them to be effective? Sanctions 
can have effects other than the ones expressed. Giumelli (2011) concludes that the most 
common reason for imposing sanctions is to send a signal – to home constituencies or 
to foreign observers. Sanctions imposed for this reason can have an effect even if they 
don’t compel the target to change. 
Myanmar is of strategic interest to its neighbouring countries, located as it is at the 
intersection of the major economies of China, India and ASEAN and providing China 
with access to the Bay of Bengal. It is, however, not of significant strategic interest to 
Western powers. Decades of isolation marginalised the country in international affairs. 
Richard Horsey (2013 [interview]) describes Myanmar as an easy target for the sender 
states; “the perfect donkey to beat”. It became a useful target for states wishing to 
demonstrate a dedication to human rights without facing the costs of alienating an 
important trading partner such as China. This also provides a reason for the incremental 
imposition of the sanctions. By spreading the imposition of sanctions out over 25 years, 
the sender states were able to repeatedly confirm their devotion to human rights without 
incurring the political costs of criticizing states more central to EU and US interests. 
Kyi Kyi Nyein, as a Myanmar businesswoman, hold that “in a way, the Western states 
were worse than the [military regime]”, because of the hypocrisy of how they made life 
harder for people in Myanmar without engaging in actively pushing for changes in order 
to demonstrate their dedication to human rights.  
Giumelli (2011: 63) finds that the aim of signalling is the most common objective for 
sender states. Sanctions aimed at signalling can lead to changes in the target state if it 
acts to improve its tarnished reputation, but they do not require the target to change in 
order to achieve its aim. While the objective of signalling can be combined with an 
intention of compelling the target to change, sanctions aimed at compelling the target 
to change are less likely to succeed if the sender state also uses the sanctions for 
signalling purposes. Sanctions aimed at signalling are characterised by not having a 
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material impact on the target. The US sanctions can be seen as signalling until the 
BFDA of 2003, while the EU sanctions remained so until the 2007 Common position 
750. However, even after comprehensive sanctions were imposed, the Western powers 
were too economically insignificant to be able to constrain Myanmar through restricting 
trade. Steinberg & Fan (2012: 358) write that 
the Chinese response has been one of quiet diplomacy with the Burmese, while the US, 
because of its transparent political process, prefers public, often heterogeneous, 
displays of concern or anger.  
 
This is in line with the idea of using sanctions to signal dissatisfaction with Myanmar. 
Western states were unable to coerce Myanmar to change or to constrain it solely 
through limiting its access to goods. Therefore, their main effect – using Giumelli’s 
typology of sanctions as either coercing, constraining or signalling – remained primarily 
signalling. Giumelli and Ivan (2013: 32) conclude that: 
The case of Myanmar shows that sanctions can play only a marginal role if the strategy 
does not intend to go beyond signalling to domestic constituencies (Giumelli & Ivan 
2013: 32) 
 
In contrast to the research stating that autocratic leaders can manage to divert the cost 
of sanctions away from themselves, the sender states found support for sanctions among 
parts of the Myanmar opposition. In a video tape smuggled out of Myanmar in 1996, 
NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi called for more sanctions. She dismissed the claim that 
sanctions hurt the people, stating that "I think that the only people whom sanctions will 
affect are the privileged." (Reuters 1996). Aung San Suu Kyi’s respected position and 
access to Western media gave Western governments justification for their policies, 
increasing the signalling effect as sanctions seemed to be in line with the wishes of the 
people of Myanmar. 
There are some indications that Western states intended for sanctions to serve domestic 
interests. The role of domestic interests in creating their sanction criteria is illustrated 
by the US demand for tackling the smuggling of drugs from Myanmar. 
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5.1.4 Decreased smuggling of drugs from Myanmar as sanction criterion 
One of the US arguments for stepping up the sanctions with the BFDA in 2003 was the 
significant Myanmar drugs production (108th Congress: 2.8). Myanmar is the world’s 
second largest producer of opium (after Afghanistan), and the largest producer of 
methamphetamines (Wyler 2008: 10). Much of the heroin in the United States comes 
from Myanmar. The United States supported government efforts to combat production 
and smuggling of drugs up until 1988, when it terminated the support as a reaction to 
the violence (Steinberg 2010: 105). 
The flow of drugs from Myanmar to the United States made it possible for US policy 
makers to present developments in Myanmar as a national security issue. This increased 
the chances of congressional support for sanctions, by making sanctions part of the US 
war on drugs instead of solely a human rights issue. However, Congress criticised the 
SPDC for failing to eradicate opium crops while at the same time stopping US efforts 
to help it tackle the issue: 
In 2002, the United States and the junta met quietly to discuss steps to take Myanmar 
off the international narcotics list, but a number of congressional members sought to 
continue to isolate the regime, preventing this. (Steinberg 2010: 105) 
 
It was emphasized that drug money within Myanmar funded the ethnic conflicts, but 
toned down that the main beneficiaries of drug money were ethnic rebel forces not 
directly targeted by sanctions. Hindering production and illegal border trade would be 
costly and difficult for Myanmar, even if the government wished to satisfy the demands. 
Most opium in Myanmar is grown in conflict-ridden border-states, primarily by poor 
farmers (BBC 2012). Thus, governmental control over the growth of opium poppies has 
been limited. As the government destroyed fields of opium poppies, the production of 
methamphetamines increased. Poppy fields can be seen on satellites, but the poor 
infrastructure in Myanmar makes it hard to discover producers of methamphetamines. 
Sanctions research was available to US policy makers, concluding that for sanctions to 
be effective, the demands must be possible for the target to meet. While limiting drug 
export was not a formal demand, its inclusion in the BFDA presents it as something the 
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United States expect the SPDC to be able to tackle. In 2008 a Congressional Research 
Service report stated that analysts feared that  
should the SPDC begin to combat the drug trade more vigorously, current ceasefire 
groups may choose to break their agreements with the SPDC in order to protect their 
drug trade territories. (Wyler 2008: 6) 
 
The sender states – in this case the United States – thus knew that eradication of opium 
fields was difficult, that the producers were difficult to target through sanctions, and 
that compliance could cause problems for Myanmar’s fragile national stability. While 
the production of opium shrunk during the 2000s, Wyler concludes that “U.S. policies 
have not yielded substantial leverage in combating transnational crime emanating from 
Burma” (Wyler 2008: 16). The decrease, she holds, is to a large extent the result of a 
decision by the rebel group the United Wa State Army to stop providing the opium and 
heroin markets (Wyler 2008: 6f). It is reasonable to question the US commitment to 
decreasing the flow of drugs from Myanmar, or whether sanctions were in fact not 
solely created to coerce change within Myanmar. Policy makers had either not looked 
into research on effective sanctions before designing those for Myanmar, or they had 
chosen to disregard the advice found in previous studies. Either option shows a lack of 
commitment designing effective sanctions, if effectiveness is measured by change in 
Myanmar rather than by satisfying domestic interests.  
Did the factors discussed in this section lead the SLORC/SPDC to believe that sanctions 
would be retained even if it complied with Western demands? Not necessarily, but they 
did give SLORC/SPDC reason to question whether this would be the case. The Western 
powers demanded changes that were either unclear or impossible to meet in the short 
term. This lends partial support to the first part of H3 – that the threat of sanctions failed 
because Myanmar could not be certain about the benefits of compliance – but it only 
explains the initial lack of compliance with Western demands. In order to support the 
hypothesis, the fear that sanctions could be maintained regardless of the regime’s 
compliance must have been stilled at some point. 
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5.2 A CHANGED PERCEPTION OF THE BENEFITS OF COMPLIANCE? 
Was there a change in the Myanmar government’s perception of the benefits of 
compliance? If Myanmar’s analyses about their options in the face of sanctions changed 
during the sanctioned years, this change should have some identifiable origin. The Hovi 
et al. (2005: 489, quoted above) definition of what can make a state change its 
perspective on sanctions is quite strict: that the sender state makes it “unequivocally 
clear, via negotiation or a formal decision by an international body, that sanctions will 
be lifted if the target reconsiders.”  
According to Hovi et al., a target state’s perception will normally change through formal 
negotiations either between the sender state(s) and the target or because of a statement 
from an international body. If the Myanmar government changed its perception, this 
could either be a result of efforts of the sender states to convince it that compliance 
would in fact lead to a lifting of sanctions, or it could be a result of a concrete event. 
Myanmar’s direct channels of communication with Western states were limited during 
the sanction years. In order to undermine the regime’s legitimacy, Western states - 
particularly the United States - obstructed Myanmar’s access to international forums 
such as the international financial institutions. They also scaled down diplomatic 
representation in Myanmar. The United States downgraded its diplomatic presence in 
Myanmar to the level of chargé d’affaires in 1993, when they removed their ambassador 
from Yangon (Institute of Southeast Asian studies 2010: 435). The European Union did 
not yet have common diplomatic representation at that point, but they responded by 
placing a moratorium on high-level bilateral contact in 1996 (see Table 2.1). This policy 
of non-engagement does not support the idea that negotiations left the regime convinced 
that the Western states would reward compliance. 
In order to identify a change in the SLORC/SPDC view of the sanctions, I look for 
developments in Myanmar’s contact with Western powers leading up to the reforms. 
There are two main alternatives when identifying a starting point for the changes in 
Myanmar.  The first is when the 7 Step Roadmap to Disciplined Democracy was 
launched in 2003.  
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At that point, US diplomatic involvement in Myanmar had been scaled down since the 
United States removed its Ambassador from Yangon in 1988, and the sanctions did not 
allow for meetings between high-ranking US officials and the Myanmar regime. The 
US also blocked Myanmar from access to international forums (see Table 2.1). There 
were no formal negotiations or statements to prove to Myanmar that sanctions would 
be lifted if Myanmar complied. Similarly, 
(…) EU policy towards Myanmar was almost exclusively a sanctions policy. Since 
restrictive measures could be removed only upon political concessions from the military 
junta, the EU did not give itself alternative tools to address the situation in Myanmar. 
In other words, the EU did not devise alternative strategies which may have supported 
or contributed to some form of change inside Myanmar. (Giumelli & Ivan 2013: 28) 
 
The Western policy was one of isolation, not negotiation. US officials had their first 
direct meetings with representatives of the Myanmar regime in 2007 (Wikileaks 2009), 
after the first steps of the 7 Step Roadmap had been implemented. 
Western states did not embrace the launch of the Roadmap as any plan for genuine 
democratic reforms and gave it little attention. It was criticized for failing to provide a 
timetable and for not being inclusive, in particular for not including the NLD in the 
process (Taylor: 177). Until the election of Aung San Suu Kyi to Parliament in the April 
2012 supplementary elections, the reform process was criticized for being non-
democratic. In retrospect there is a clear line from the launch of the Roadmap leading 
up to the elections in 2010 and the supplementary elections in 2012, and continuing 
towards the upcoming 2015 national elections. However, it was not clear from the onset 
that the Roadmap would be effectively pursued and result in democracy. The main 
external support for the Roadmap came from China, who “praised this process as 
ardently as other states (…) opposed it” (Steinberg & Fan 2012: 160). There is some 
doubt as to whether the Roadmap was initially intended to lead to the far-reaching 
democratic changes we have seen since 2010 (Horsey 2013 [interview]). Therefore, it 
is possible to consider a later date as the starting point for substantial reforms. The 
Roadmap led to the establishment of a constitutional government, but further reforms 
undertaken after that was necessary to convince both the opposition and the Western 
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powers that the new constitutional government was ready for a more democratic system 
with respect for human rights and with genuine competition among political parties. 
The starting point for these further reforms was the November 2010 national elections, 
which were followed by the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and which led to the 
establishment of Thein Sein’s constitutionally elected government in March 2011. This 
election came after the 2007 meeting between Myanmar and US officials. The details 
of this meeting are not public, so we cannot know if the United States expressed any 
clearer conditions for a suspension of sanctions. While this meeting indicates a US 
interest in resolving the case of Myanmar, its content is unknown and it seems unlikely 
that any agreement was made. The United States has since been the most restrictive 
actor when it comes to lifting sanctions seemingly holding on to the demands made in 
public statements. Some of the lag in the US response can be explained by the 
complexity of US sanctions – the restrictions on Myanmar are embedded in a number 
of laws and amendments. Thus, it would take time to lift sanctions completely. However, 
the decision to maintain the sanctions against the gems industry and against some 
individuals in addition to the continued arms embargo (as seen in Chapter 2) indicate 
that the reforms up to this point have fallen short of US demands. It remains to be seen 
if developments in Myanmar in 2015 will satisfy the United States further so it lifts the 
remaining sanctions. 
The European Union is unlikely to have had any direct talks with Myanmar concerning 
the conditions for lifting sanctions. There are no reports indicating secret meetings. The 
information currently available does not support the idea that the 2010 elections were 
preceded by any serious talks between either of the Western powers and Myanmar. The 
moratoriums both states had on high-level diplomatic talks illustrate how sanctions 
were used alone as a policy tool against Myanmar. The United States and the European 
Union also did not tend the 2011 transfer of power as a clear sign of a significantly 
improved human and political situation. The elections were not considered free and fair. 
However, changes continued at a fast pace after Thein Sein’s new government took 
power. 
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5.2.1 An alternative way of imposing sanctions: The case of ILO sanctions 
The lack of official channels of communication between Western countries and 
Myanmar left the Myanmar government in the dark as to exactly how much Myanmar 
would have to change in order for sanctions to be lifted. Richard Horsey claims that  
[The Western sanctions policy] was a failed policy, and it was never intended to be an 
effective strategy. […] The problem with sanctions wasn’t so much that they were 
imposed, but that they weren’t imposed strategically. (Horsey 2013 [interview]).  
 
Horsey emphasizes that sanctions were not combined with other diplomatic tools such 
as negotiations. Horsey (forthcoming) describes the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) strategy against Myanmar as an alternative to the Western policies. Like Western 
states, the ILO responded to the grave human rights abuses in Myanmar with sanctions. 
However, the ILO only passed a resolution in 1999, after prolonged attempts at 
negotiation making the threat of sanctions and their demands clear (Horsey forthcoming: 
6). The ILO resolution declared that member states should review their relations with 
the Myanmar. The demands made were limited in scope, focusing on labour rights and 
in particular the army’s habitual use of forced labour. 
Further, these measures were followed by continued attempts to help Myanmar meet 
their demands – including offering Myanmar technical assistance to help it deal with 
forced labour. This active policy led to negotiations between Myanmar and ILO already 
later the same year. Horsey is careful not to give ILO full credit for a shift in attitude in 
Myanmar that happened around the turn of the millennium. However, the concessions 
Myanmar eventually gave to the ILO suggest that the measures were effective (Horsey 
forthcoming: 8). This way of using sanctions as a tool in negotiations differs from how 
sanctions were used by the European Union and the United States. By providing 
technical assistance, the ILO actions contrast the US attempts to end the drug flow from 
Myanmar. As seen above, the United States cut off the support Myanmar had previously 
received to combat drugs smuggling already in 1988, only later to point to the security 
issues stemming from the drugs trade as an argument for sanctions. The lack of 
negotiations and assistance accompanying the Western sanctions may imply a lack of 
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interest in finding a solution to the situation, making the sanctions appear to be primarily 
punitive. 
5.2.2 The role of sanctions since 2011 
It is neither possible nor necessary to decisively define the starting point for substantial 
changes in Myanmar. The reforms happened incrementally, and the implementation of 
the 7 Step Roadmap from 2003 must with hindsight be seen as a clear part of the road 
to genuine reform. This chapter has found little support for the idea that genuine reforms 
only came after a reassurance that this would lead to a lifting of sanctions. However, 
Min Zaw Oo (2013 [interview]) holds that sanctions had an effect after Thein Sein came 
to power in 2011 and the reform process was in motion. While he holds that the reforms 
were triggered not by sanctions but by the political elite realising that the old policy had 
failed, the new government needed sanctions to be lifted because it faced a legitimacy 
crisis: 
The government wanted to demonstrate that it is a legitimate government that is 
recognised by the international community. [Moreover,] the government had to make 
sure that the economic sanctions were lifted in order to bring in economic opportunities 
to people. So their legitimacy comes from both the international community and the 
Burmese public. This is how the sanctions became effective (Min Zaw Oo 2013 
[interview]). 
 
As mentioned above, the 7 Step Roadmap received little international attention before 
2011. Since 2011, however, when the first five steps had been taken, the process of 
change began to impress international public opinion, including the European Union 
and the United States. As shown in Chapter 2, a number of political leaders have visited 
Myanmar since 2011, and President Thein Sein has been welcomed to the United States 
and to several European countries.  
With the new interest and cautious optimism for the reform process, both the European 
Union and the United States reviewed their sanction policies towards Myanmar. The 
most notable change came with the EU decision to suspend sanctions for one year in 
April 2012, thereby acknowledging the changes that had occurred. Further, they 
promised Myanmar that sanctions would be lifted if the reform process kept its 
momentum for one more year. I cannot conclude that the European Union made it 
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“unequivocally clear [through] a formal decision by an international body” (Hovi et al. 
2005: 489), that sanctions would be lifted if the progress continued. However, I hold 
that the suspension of the sanctions and promises of lifting them Myanmar maintained 
the momentum of reform, carry the same weight as a formal promise. I consider this the 
first time the European Union or the United States made their criteria clear and realistic 
within a short timeframe. The United States reacted differently than the European Union. 
While it had been quicker to impose sanctions, it also kept them longer. As of April 
2014, it had not yet followed the European Union in lifting them. However, President 
Obama’s 2012 general waiver of restrictions on US investments in most sectors of the 
Myanmar economy represent an indefinite suspension of sanctions on these sectors. 
Even a critic of sanctions such as Richard Horsey (2013 [interview]) describes them as 
a “force for change” after Thein Sein came to power. As Thein Sein’s government 
sought to attract foreign capital, it focused on improving the outside world’s impression 
of the country. The demands from Western states provided a guideline for the reforms. 
At the same time, Western sanctions had been in line with demands made by the NLD, 
which had great support in the country. Thus, complying with Western demands would 
be popular within Myanmar as well. The Western states’ demands for good governance 
and respect for human rights were higher than corresponding demands to Myanmar’s 
neighbouring countries, despite its limited institutions and weak governmental capacity. 
Myanmar’s human rights reputation increased greatly after Thein Sein came to power. 
The Western responses, and especially the suspension of EU sanctions, made it 
reasonable for Myanmar to assume that further compliance would also be rewarded. 
To get the sanctions lifted became politically more important after Thein Sein became 
president. The 2010 election was a crucial step in that it established a constitutional 
government. The new political structure proved important for the effect of sanctions. 
Authoritarian political structures are able to push the cost of sanctions away from the 
elite. The elite is therefore not as threatened by the sanctions as they would have been 
if they had less control over the distribution of resources within the country. In a non-
democratic system like that of Myanmar, the people were kept in control by a large 
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army. As long as the elite could maintain that system, sanctions hurting the poor did not 
pose a threat to the government. 
This can hardly work in a democracy. If the people hit by sanctions are the ones who 
decide who should be in government, the government will have an incentive to get rid 
of the cause of the suffering. Its own political survival will depend on it. Only when 
Myanmar transitioned towards a multi-party democracy did the sanctions begin to have 
a significant direct effect on the political elite. 
 
5.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has analysed the merits of H3. First, I considered whether the threat of 
sanctions failed because the Myanmar government believed that the sender states would 
implement and uphold sanctions regardless of any positive response to the threats. 
Second, I looked at whether this belief changed at some point, which in turn could 
explain Myanmar’s later reforms. 
I have found some support for the first element, that Myanmar had reasons to question 
whether the sender states would lift the sanctions if Myanmar met their demands. The 
EU criteria for lifting the sanctions were vague, while the US demands were extensive. 
The demands made were nearly impossible to meet without the regime giving up power. 
According to Miljkovic’ theory, this meant that the regime had no incentive to adapt. 
I only found limited support for the second part of the hypothesis, namely that the 
Western powers at some point made it clear that they would lift the sanctions if 
Myanmar complied. While the developments after 2011 gained momentum as Western 
powers resumed communication and started to reward reforms by easing the sanctions, 
the actual reform process started prior to these changes. The earliest signs of change – 
the government’s launch of the 7 Step Roadmap to Disciplined Democracy and 
subsequent implementation step by step – was not portrayed as compliance by Western 
observers. However, they laid the foundation for later reforms, as they helped the elite 
consolidate power. This in turn let it overcome the threat compliance initially meant to 
their security, which had been the greatest obstacle to compliance. As these reforms 
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were a success and Myanmar managed to transform itself into a semi-democracy, 
sanctions began to have a more direct effect as the cost to the people became important. 
The resumption of diplomatic relations gave the Myanmar government confidence that 
compliance would be rewarded, and this became clearer with the suspension of EU 
sanctions in April 2012. Thus, H3 helps to explain why the acceleration of the process 
in the last years, even though it fails to explain the initiation of the reforms that would 
lead up to compliance. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has analysed the effect of Western sanctions on recent political change in 
Myanmar, to answer the question 
Were the political changes in Myanmar caused by the EU and US sanctions? 
In order to provide an answer, the analysis has been structured around three hypotheses 
developed from rational choice theory.  
My first hypothesis, H1, was that sanctions initially failed because Myanmar 
underestimated the Western powers’ dedication to impose and maintain sanctions, but 
that this subsequently changed. I did not find support for this explanation for 
compliance. The regime’s promise of elections in 1989 when the first sanctions were 
imposed was undermined by the failure to respect the outcome of these elections. 
Further, the promise to hold elections had many reasons, of which the mostly symbolic 
sanctions of 1988 are unlikely to have been the most important. Myanmar did not have 
reason to believe that sanctions would be lifted unless they complied. The sanctions 
were cheap for the sender states, and the United States had in the past proved willing to 
maintain sanctions over a sustained period of time. Finally, one would have expected 
Myanmar to comply sooner if they realised that they had underestimated the threat of 
sanctions. 
In contrast, I have found support for H2: that Myanmar complied after the sanctions 
were imposed because it only gradually came to understand the total cost of sanctions. 
According to theory, it will often take time for the cost to become clear to the target in 
cases like this. This can explain why it took more than two decades before Myanmar 
complied. As the sanctions increased incrementally over a long time, and as the 
sanctions in time also came to influence Myanmar’s relations with its neighbouring 
countries, the full cost of sanctions would have been difficult to assess at the onset.  
In addition, I have found partial support for H3: that Myanmar initially failed to comply 
because it was uncertain about whether the sender states would reward compliance with 
easing the sanctions, but did so when it became clear that compliance would be 
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rewarded. I argue that the Myanmar government’s incentives to comply was thwarted 
by the uncertainty of how the sender states would respond to compliance. The sanctions 
against Myanmar were designed in a way that failed to meet existing criteria for how 
sanctions can succeed. By presenting Myanmar with demands it would be unrealistic 
that it could meet regardless of its intentions, and by refusing to combine the sanctions 
with negotiations in the attempt to find solutions, the sender states showed little real 
interest in the developments in Myanmar. This could point to the sender states using the 
case of Myanmar to signal a dedication to promotion of human rights to their 
constituencies. If the real effect the sender states aimed for through their sanctions 
policy was domestic rather than in Myanmar, the Myanmar government risked that 
reforms would go unnoticed. For years this was also the case. A change occurred after 
the 2010 elections and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, as Western states began to 
recognise the changes.  
The release of Aung San Suu Kyi was the first of the Myanmar reforms that could be 
seen as compliance with Western demands. The attention from the Western states in 
turn served to reassure Myanmar that further compliance would be rewarded. At this 
point the reforms in Myanmar had already progressed far, so this does not explain the 
initial decision to implement reforms. However, it can explain the momentum the 
process got after 2010. Since then, reforms in Myanmar have gone beyond what the 7 
Step Roadmap entailed, and the regime has been rewarded by restoration of normal 
diplomatic ties and an ease of sanctions. 
In conclusion, I have found that sanctions had an effect in the case of Myanmar, both 
on Than Shwe’s decision to implement political reforms and for Thein Sein’s dedication 
to economic reform and human rights improvements. Sanctions affected Than Shwe’s 
policy-making when its relative cost had increased beyond what was expected. 
However, this increase in the relative cost of sanctions to the point where it outweighed 
the cost of maintaining status quo came as a result of indirect effects of sanctions, in 
particular the increasing Chinese dominance in Myanmar. 
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Based on both theory on criteria for successful sanctions and the pre-2010 predictions 
for their effect in Myanmar, sanctions should not have had an effect on the political 
developments in Myanmar. This thesis has contributed to Hovi et al.’s theory on the 
effect of imposed sanctions by including indirect effects of sanctions, which in the case 
of Myanmar tipped the balance of the regime’s cost-benefit analysis. 
While few of the reforms that Than Shwe initiated qualify as compliance with Western 
demands– except for the 2010 release of Aung San Suu Kyi and arguably the transition 
of power – they paved the way for the later reforms. The political changes initiated by 
Than Shwe made it possible for Thein Sein’s government to reform without risking a 
political backlash. Before the consolidation of the military’s power through the 7 Step 
Roadmap, compliance would have threatened the security of the military elite. This 
threat removed the military elite’s incentive to reform, as they would not have able to 
reap the benefits of compliance. Thus, I have considered the plan for reforms that was 
announced in 2003 as an important starting point for the transformation of Myanmar 
that would eventually lead to the lifting of sanctions. 
When Thein Sein came to power, his policies were a continuation of Than Shwe’s 
reforms. However, he took these reforms further than what was expressed in the 2003 
7 Step Roadmap by stepping up the peace efforts and by implementing reforms to 
improve the realisation of human and political rights. Under Thein Sein’s rule, the 
sanctions got a real direct effect. As Myanmar was transitioning towards a democracy, 
the opinion of the people became central in a way it had not been before. Under elite 
rule, the effect of sanctions remained limited as the authoritarian regime could divert 
the cost of sanctions from the elite to the people. When a regime is not dependent on 
popular support, even a large cost to the people can fail to compel the regime to change 
(Hovi 2007: 78). The elite could make their money from trade with Myanmar’s 
neighbours, and had access to ways of overcoming the cost of sanctions. However, 
under democracy the opinion of the people matters. The new government had to gain 
legitimacy within the democratic system. The legitimacy in turn came from both 
improving the regime’s human rights record, and from increasing the country’s 
economic prospects. The government could gain legitimacy from its people through 
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improving their economic prospect. In order to achieve this, the sanctions would need 
to be eased. Sanctions, in turn, would only be eased if Myanmar complied with Western 
demands for human rights improvements. 
I claim that the success of sanctions was unforeseen. It was unforeseen in that its effect 
could not have been predicted by the sender states. The sanctions did not alone have a 
high enough cost to compel Myanmar to change, but its relative cost increased as a 
result of a complex set of developments during Than Shwe’s rule. The increased 
dominance of China on Myanmar decision-making became especially important. The 
Chinese presence in Myanmar came about because Myanmar lacked alternative trade 
partners due to the sanctions. In addition, the military elite consolidated its power in the 
last decade of sanctions, which decreased the cost of compliance. The direct effect the 
sanctions came to have for Thein Sein’s presidency in turn came as a result of the 
governmental change. If the sanctions depended on democracy to be effective, they 
were not an effective tool when they were imposed on a dictatorship.  
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